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Since the close of World War II one of the main objectives of 
Uni ted Stat es foreign policy has been the geographic "containment" of 
communismo I n Europe, this took form and substance in the Truman Doc~ 
trine, the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization . 
Probably i t i s not premature to claim success for United States and 
Allied policies in that area of the world . Containing communist expan-
s i on in Asia , however» has posed a different and ~astly more complex 
task for the United States o The main problem, of course, has been ad-
j usting t o the emergence of the People 9s Republic of China o Inextri-
cably i nvolved with this question has been the companion problem of 
formul ating policies vis- a=vis the Government of the Republic of China, 
io e o, Formosa ~ the Pescadores and the offshore islands along the main-
l and coast of China o 
Our Si nocentri c poli cy in Asia is not a new phenomenon; however, 
i ts objectives we~_e drastically altered following the triumph of the 
Chinese Communi sts on the mainland o Following that victory 9 in 1949 ~ 
American policymaker s were beset by a certain ambivalence o Earlier de-
sires to see China united, strong, and unimpaired by foreign interven-
tion were real ized==but under the aegis of a vastly different kind of 
regime t han most of our policymakers has foreseen or desired o 
As wi ll be devel oped later~ the United States offici ally decided 
by l at e 1949 t hat i t woul d not militarily interfere in the denouement 
of the Chinese Civil War, Such a decision was in line with our earlier 
policy of "non-intervention," It also took cognizance of the reality 
that our post-World War II China policy had met with resounding failure; 
and, finally, it signified a general conviction in Washington that the 
fall of Formosa was imminent and that a final break with the Kuomintang 
was in order, 
This fateful decision to abandon the Nationalist cause was summari-
ly reversed by President Truman in 1950, because, inter alia, of the 
circumstances arising from the initiation of hostilities by North Korea. 
The interposition of the United States 7th Fleet to "neutralize" 
Formosa and the Pescadores marked the beginning of our present China 
policy. It established a kind of precedent or framework for the future 
treatment of the mainland and Formosa regimes by American policymakers. 
Both of these aspects of policy, naturally, are subsumed under the total 
Asian policy challenge--a context within which the subsidiary problem of 
the defense of the Chinese offshore islands must be considered. 
The purpose of this study is to determine the present United States / 
policy regarding the defense of the Chinese offshore islands. Of neces-
sity this involves an analysis of the evolution of United States rela-
tion with Formosa since World War II. American policy on Formosa has 
evolved from a position of uncertainty over its status in the late 
1940 1 s to a commitment to support and defend the Nationalist regime 
when the Korean War focused the attention of the United States upon the 
problem of Communist expansion efforts, An underlying assumption of 
this study is that Formosa is vital to the United States defense peri-
meter in Asia; that the Uni ted States is not willing to permit Formosa 
to be united with the Communist-controlled mainland. It is further 
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assumed that the offshore islands are of no particular importance to the 
United States' defensive position, except to the extent that they might 
be used to threaten the security of Formosa and the Pescadores themselves. 
With these assumptions in mind, it is the hypothesis of this study that 
the United States has not made an absolutely firm commitment to defend 
the offshore islands; that the United States position has been conscious-
ly kept vague and even ambiguous in order that each threat to the secur-
ity of the offshore islands could be analyzed within the context of the 
broader interest of the United States in certain insular and peninsular 
regions of the Western Pacific. This also implies, and this study seeks 
to confirm, that the question of the offshore islands is closely linked 
to the broader "containment of communism" policy of the United States 
in a Pan-Asian context . 
During the course of this inquiry it is necessary to consider con-
tributory elements other than just presidential policy pronouncements 
or the constitutional relationships between the Congress and the Com-
mander-in-Chief . As required, therefore, the role of the successive 
Secretaries of State, the influence of Congress in foreign policy mat-
ers, the actions of certain foreign powers, the work of particular pub-
licists, and general historical data are all considered. Upon the basis 
of these materials is established the requisite foundation upon which 
rest the conclusions found at the end of the study. 
The methodology utilized in the preparation of this thesis is both 
descriptive and explanatory . Rather extensive use was made of United 
States Government documentary sources . Also employed were political 
science journals, periodicals and newspapers. An invaluable source was 
found in the various biographical and personal accounts of former 
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Presidents, statesmen, and government officials. 
' A scrutiny of previous work accomplished in this area of foreign 
policy formulation revealed no effort to examine the evolution of United 
States policy on the offshore islands over the extensive time span com-
prehended by this study. Most references to the problem were fragmen-
tary and incomplete o Those that were found in periodicals, journals and 
various news sources offered only the brief or contempory treatment one 
would expect to find in such publications. The work by Tang Tsou1 is 
the most comprehensive in the fieldo It provided the author with valu-
able insight and perspective in accomplishing this study. 
The introduction, or Chapter I, SQY.~ earlier United States policy 
toward China in general and Formosa in particular. It also treats brief-
ly those concluding aspects of the Chinese Civil War which helped shape 
America's China policy up until the end of 1949. 
Chapter II ~ontains an analysis of those factors that prompted the 
United States policy reversal regarding Formosa during the tenure of 
President Truman o Initial United States policy statements were examined 
to determine whether there was at that juncture any awareness that the 
offshore islands were a potential source of future Sino-American compli-
cations. 
Chapter III deals with the formalization of our containment policy 
and relationships with Formosa during President Eisenhower's years in 
office. Especial attention is directed to the actions of Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles in this period. 
A review and analysis of presidential remarks and actions during 
1Tang Tsou, The Embroilment~ Quemoy (Salt Lake City, 1959). 
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the terms of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson comprise Chapter IV. Par-
ticular attention is given to President Kennedy's stated positions on 
this issue before and after the 1960 presidential elections. 
Chapter V contains those conclusions which the author believes are 
justified by the evidence revealed in the body of the study. 
Finally, numerous acknowledgements are in order. The author wishes 
to thank Dr. Clifford A. L, Rich, Head, Department of Political Science, 
for his invaluable criticisms at all stages of this work. A similar 
debt is owed to Professor Harold V. Sare, Political Science Department, 
for his many contributions of time and his scholarly critiques as the 
study progressed. 
Sincer~ thanks for patient assistance is extended to the officers 
and staff of the Oklahoma State University Library; their many indul-
gences will be long remembered . 
Lastly, appreciation is extended to Mrs. June Webb, who prepared 
the final copy of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Importance of the Problem 
' 1 d l . United States concern over the Chinese offshore is ans, i.e., 
their defense and final disposition, is an aspect of our foreign policy 
that perhaps has received less than its just due from publicists. As 
a matter of practicality, this probably is attributable, inter alia. to 
the fact that the problem of the offshore islands has. to a large extent, 
been ignored in times of relative tranquility and superficially dealt 
with in times of crisiso The former United States ambassador (1949-1957) 
to Taipei. Mr o Karl Lott Rankin, noted that 
Many questions about China, by their very nature, could 
not be answered by a simple yes or no ••• There was a continu-
ing and natural tendency to center attention on the locus of 
the most excitement at a given moment. When the communists 
were temporarily quiet in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, 
for example, and chose that time for a bombardment of the 
offshore islands, prominent press correspondents would 
lin this study the term "Chinese offshore islands" is construed to 
mean those residual islets off the mainland of China which remain under 
effective Chinese Nationalist political and military control. Origi-
nally, in late 1949, the Nationalists held up to 30-odd such islands, 
ranging from the Chusans near Shanghai to the very large island of 
Hainan in the Gulf of Tonkin. Today, only the Quemoy (Kinmen) and 
Matsu groups remain. The Pescadores (Penghus) Islands are more closely 
associated with Formosa, both historically and geographically, than 
with the mainlando Those many "offshore" islands captured by the 
Chinese Communists in the closing days of the principal mainland strug-
gle are obviously not of substantive concern to this study. 
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converge on Taipei. For a few days we would make the front 
pages. Political and editorial writers in various countries 
would point to the dreadful situations in and around Taiwan. 
Drastic and urgent proposals would be advanced, often if not 
usually at someone else's expense. Then the shooting would 
stop and the Reds would push a button elsewhere. The Fourth 
Estate would pack their bags and fly away, Their editors 
would forget about Taiwan, except for incidental references 
to the "relaxation of tension" in our region, which misled 
many into believing that there had been a basic change for 
the better. 2 
His view in 1954 that an understanding of the complexities of the 
hardy and perennial "China problem" cannot be gained by a few days "on-
the-spot" reporting during the heat of a temporary crisis remains valid 
today. Particularly does this remain true with regard to the offshore 
islands issue. 
2 
Few facets of United States foreign policy, at least the post-World 
War II Asian aspects of it, are surcharged with such ambiguity and con-
tradiction . Contrarily, few aspects of America's China policy have been 
subjected to such high level debate and reflection. Even today, after 
countless words and several years, one may reasonably inquire, as does 
this author: what, in fact, is the United States' present policy with 
respect to the offshore islands and how did that policy evolve? 
While it probably would be intellectually stimulating and satisfy-
ing to be able to examine this matter within the total context of our 
recorded relations with China, such treatment is well beyond the scope 
of this work. At the present juncture, at least, the names of Quemoy 
and Matsu would probably suffer in stature when arrayed alongside such 
larger issues as the Open Door Policy and the Marshall Mission. Hope-
fully, upon completion of this paper, the reader will be able to make 
2Karl Lott Rankin, China Assignment (New York, 1964), pp. 215-216. 
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a fair determinat ion of the relative merits that such a comparison would 
produce . 
Perhaps Hans Morgenthau 1 s prefatory remarks in a monograph by Tang 
Tsou can best tell us why we should want to know more of America's pol-
icy toward the offshore islands and how it evolved as it did: 
• •• the issue of China and the conflict over the offshore 
islands in which that issue manifests itself is potentially 
the most explosive of all the unresolved issues with which 
the United States must deal around the globe. For this issue 
does not concern control of a piece of territory, or politi-
cal and economic influences in a limited region. Rather it 
concerns the overall distribution of power in the Far East 
and the place of a potentially great power, such as China, 
within it . The assertion of predominance, thus far more in 
words than by deeds, by China, is met by its denial on the 
part of the United States, It is hard to see how this con-
flict can be compromised . 3 
Early Historical Perspective 
American concern with Formosa before World War II was almost wholly 
commercial and even those interests were relatively modest. 4 Certainly 
there could not have been the remotest idea in those earlier days that 
the offshore islands of China would one day become a most exacerbating 
influence upon Sino- American relations. 
American policy did not officially call for the preservation of the 
territorial and administrative integrity of China until the pronounce-
ments of Secretary of State John Hay in 1899-1900 showed our adherence 
to the concept of the Open Door . Any possible grounds for American 
3Tang Tsou, p . 1. 
4Joseph w. Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign 
Policy (Washington, 1952), p . 116. 
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foreign policy interest in Formosa, however, were earlier foreclosed by 
China ' s cession of that island to Japan in 1895, 5 Thus, until America's 
war with Japan there was no legal or political basis for any kind of 
United States "policy" on Formosa. 
It is a rather curious facet of history, however, that things might 
have been vastly different if the recommendations of an early United 
States Commissioner to China, the Reverend Peter Parker, had been accept-
ed. Commissioner Parker suggested, in a note of December 1856, to Sec-
retary of State Marcy that America should "temporarily" seize Formosa 
with an eye to forcing China to abide by certain of its treaty obliga-
tions to the United States and other powers, The reply that Washington 
sent to him revealed more than just American official thinking about the 
acquisition of colonial possessions, It reflected a very restrictive 
interpretation of presidential powers with regard to the employment of 
United States forces abroad . Secretary Marcy told Parker that 
The President does not believe that our relations with 
China warrant the "last" resort you speak of, and if they did, 
the military or naval forces of the United States could be used 
only by the authority of the Congress, The "last" resort means 
war, and the executive branch of this government is not the war-
making power •••• For the protection and security of Americans in 
China and the protection of their property, it may be expedient 
to increase our naval f orce on the China station, but the Presi-
dent will not do it for aggressive purposes. 6 
5The Treaty of Shi monoseki, signed in 1895, concluded the first Sino-
Japanses War and resulted , among other things, in the acquisition of the 
Pescadores and Formosa by Japan . The designations "Formosa" and "Taiwan" 
are interchangeable at one ' s option . The early Portuguese explorers 
named it Formosa or "Beautiful Island" in 1590, The name Taiwan means 
"Land of the Terraced Bay" and is used consistently by the native people 
as well as by the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, Recent official 
United States government usage prefers "Taiwan." 
6sophia Su- fei Yen, Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations (Hamden, 
Conn . , 1965), pp . 66- 67 , 
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Marcy's reply put an end to any possible official American steps to 
unilaterally seize Taiwan. Similarly rejected was Townsend Harris' sug-
gestion in 1854, that the United States acquire all or part of Formosa 
by purchase from either China or the aboriginal inhabitants of the 
island. 7 
Wartime Planning 
United States foreign policy concern with Formosa, in a recent 
planning sense, did not take form until 1943. On December l, Presidents 
Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek, along with Prime Minister Churchill, is-
sued the joint Cairo Declaration which stated, inter alia, that it was 
the intention of the three Allies that all of the lands "stolen" from 
China by Japan, i . e., Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, be return-
ed to China . The intent of the Cairo Declaration was further affirmed 
by the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1943; this, in turn, was later 
adhered to by the Soviet Union . 
During the cl osing stages of World War II, American planning with 
regard to Formosa was concerned mainly with whether to capture the is-
land for use as a 11 stepping- stone" to the conquest of Japan, and with 
the status of Formosa following Japan's defeat ~ The first of these con-
siderations was dealt with by the decision to move directly against 
Japan from the Philippines, by- passing Formosa. The second question 
was more difficult t o reconcile . Evidence exists to show that the Ameri-
can State Department and military circles had made rather serious plans 
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for occupying and establishing a United States military government for 
Formosao The training of military government personnel for this purpose 
was instituted at Columbia University by the United States Navy. 8 As far 
as can be determined, such preparation did not receive top-level endorse-
ment. In any event, the pace of war in the Pacific Ocean areas moved so 
rapidly that all these interim plans seem to have been overtaken by other 
military and political developments. 
Finally, when the terms of the Potsdam '-Agreement were accepted by 
Japanese authorities on August 14, 1945 the resulting document of submis-
sion called for the surrender of the Japanese on Formosa to Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai- shek o When it became obvious by September of that year that 
the Nationalists forces could manage the task, all further considerations 
for an American military government apparatus on Taiwan were dropped. 9 
With the arrival of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa in September, 
1945 the island once again became a part of China. At least it did so 
pending a formal settlement of its legal status under international law; 
thus it came within the purview of the total China policy of America. 
The period following the reimposition of Chinese authority on For-
mosa was one of stress for American policy-makers in view of the contest 
between the Nationalists and the Communists for control of the mainland.10 
8Ballantine, p , 55, 
9 Ibid,, pp , 55- 56 0 
lOThe trials and tribulations of the Formosans under Chinese Nation-
alist General Chen- yi comprise a sorry chapter indeed in Chinese history 
and is a long and bitter story unto itself , Suffice to note, for the 
scope of this study, that General Chen- yi was finally put to death at 
the order of Chiang Kai - shek for his cruelties and oppressions among the 
recently "liberated" Taiwanese , 
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Immediate Postwar Policy 
During t he period from 1945 to 1949, t he American policymakers gave 
their prime at tention to an attempt to bring a semblance of order and 
peace to China-=order and peace that it sorely needed to overcome the 
political, economic, and social shambles created by years of war and 
internal strife o During this period, of course, there could be no United 
States "policy" for Formosa since the island had reverted to Nationalist 
de facto controlo It was reincorporated as Taiwan Province in 1947 0 
The quandary in which our policy planners found themselves during 
this period was sketched by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in his letter 
of transmittal to the White Paper11 issued by the Department of State on 
August 5, 19490 I n his letter, the Secretary, responding to the Presi-
dent 9 s r equest for a comprehensive record of our relations with China, 
saidg 
When peace came the United States was confronted with 
three possible alternatives in China ~ (1 ) it could have pulled 
out lock, stock~ and barrel; (2) it could have intervened 
militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to des-
troy the Communists; ( 3) it could, while assisting the Nation-
alists t o assert their authority over as much of China as 
possible~ endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a ,!com-
promise between the two sides o 
The Secretary took but few words to show why the first two alterna-
tives had been unacceptable for various historical, policy, and domestic 
political reasons o He said that American choice of the third alterna-
tive was one 
oooWhereunder We faced the facts of the situation and 
att empted to assist in working out a modus vivendi which would 
11oepartment of State, United States Relations With China (Washing-
ton g Government Printing Office 9 1949) 0 
avert civil war but nevertheless preserve and even increase 
the influence of the Nationalist Government. 
His outline of the steps the United States took to bolster the 
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Nationalist. regime and bring compromise to China is a good summary in it-
self of Chinese-American relations in the years immediately following 
the close of World War II. The summary, and the study to a much greater 
depth, cites the vain attempts by Major General Patrick J. Hurley, 
General George C. Marshall, and Lt. General Albert C. Wedemeyer to bring 
to China the stability so desperately needed in those days of upheaval 
and violence. He observed that our traditional policy of assisting China 
in her resistance to foreign aggression was " •• • confronted with the grav-
est of difficulties." To him, our aid had been without avail because 
the Chinese had been taken in by Soviet domination masked behind the 
facade of a crusading movement=-a movement accepted by many Chinese as 
wholly indigenous and national. In concluding his report to President 
Truman, the Secretary observed that: 
The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous 
result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the 
government of the United States. Nothing that this country did 
or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabili-
ties would have changed that result; nothing that was left un-
done by this country has contributed to it. It was the product 
of internal Chinese forces , forces which this country tried to 
influence but could not . A decision was arrived at within China, 
if only a decision by default • 
••• ultimately the profound civilization and democratic in-
dividualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw 
off the foreign yoke . 
In the immediate future, however, the implementation of 
our historic policy of friendship for China must be profoundly 
affected by current developments. One point, however, is clear. 
Should the Communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet 
Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against 
China's neighbors, we and other members of the United Nations 
would be confronted with a situation violative of the princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter and threatening world peace 
and security . 
Meanwhile our policy will continue to be based upon our 
own respect for the Charter, our friendship for China. and 
our traditional support for the Open Door and for China's 
independence and administrative integrity. 
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An appraisal of the American government's pronouncements and actions 
in 1949 leaves little doubt that the White Paper was the clear-cut pre-
lude to an administration effort to disentangle itself from the misfor-
tunes of Chiang and the Nationalists. This was the project which Sec-
retary of State Marshall had rejected a year before but of which Acheson 
heartily approved . Defense Secretary Johnson's protestations that it 
was politically i nadvisable to release the paper were overruled by Presi-
dent Truman. 12 Our former ambassador to Nationalist China, Karl L. 
Rankin, noted in his China Assignment that the public revelation of 
such confidential material touching people still in high public office 
was unwise and " • •• that the most valid position is that it should never 
have been published at a11 . 11 13 
The White Paper, however, was merely a surface culmination; be-
neath had raged, and was continuing, a first class battle-royal over 
what shape America 's China policy would take as the Nationalist military 
collapse accelerated and the size and impact of the debacle became pub-
licly more apparent . 
In January, 1949 upon his assumption of the Secretaryship, Dean 
Acheson attended a National Security Council meeting in which a recom-
mendation was made to President Truman to halt the $60 million worth of 
military aid st ill destined for the Nationalists from the Eightieth 
12H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy~ Party Politics (New 
Haven, 1955) 9 p. 354. 
13Rankin, p. 10. 
Congressv $125 million "additional aid" fund for China. The Council's 
advice was certainly approved by Acheson and most probably originated 
in the State Department.14 
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On February s, 1949 the White House moved to forestall new Congres-
sional criticism by hosting a private session composed of the President 9 
Vice=President 1 Secretary Acheson, and, among others, Senators Vanden-
berg and Connally. The episode was recorded in Vandenberg's diary and 
Barkley's opinion, the entry revealed 9 coincided with his. The Republi-
can Senator firmly opposed the actions recommended by the Council, say-
ingg 
••• I make it plain that I have little or no hope for 
stopping the immediate Communist conquest. That is beside 
the point. I decline to be responsible for the last push 
which makes it possible.15 
Various proposals to increase China aid 9 install American officers 
as leaders of Chinese troops, and the pledging of Chinese customs tolls 
for loan repayment were advanced by members of both parties in Congress 
in the spring of 1949 but all were, in one fashion or another~ turned 
down. In fact 9 Acheson°s reply to the Foreign Relations Committee 
·· .. : ; 
Chairman, Senator Connally, was merely a precursor of things to come 1n 
the later White ~per; he said~ 
To furnish solely military materiel and advice would only 
prolong hostilities and the suffering of the Chinese people and 
would arouse in them deep resentment against the United States. 
Yet~ to furnish the military means for bringing about a rever-
sal of the present deterioration ••• would require large Ameri-
can armed forces in actual combat ••• contrary to the interests 
of this country.1 
14westerfield 9 p. 346. 
lSibid., pp. 346=347. 
16rbid., p. 348. 
A proposal before Congressional committees on May 3, by General 
Chennault of Flying Tiger fame, for a $700 million aid program for the 
non~Communists in South China was dismissed by Acheson with a curt de-
claration that 11 oooAmerican policy was unchanged. 1117 
11 
The two painfully obvious questions on Asian policy that year were: 
(1) should the United States extend recognition to the Red Chinese, and 
(2) should the Americans aid the Nationalists in the defense of Formosa. 
Question number one has, so far, been perennially answered in the nega-
tive; question number two, proving unsusceptible to postponement because 
of rapidly moving events on the mainland, was first answered in the neg-
ative. Later events caused this to be reversed, and from this reversal 
evolved America's continued non-recognition of Communist China and the 
problem of the offshore islands. 
Since late in 1948, it had been the administration's "policy" that 
the United States had insufficient armed forces to commit to the defense 
of the island of Formosa--notwithstanding its strategic importance. On 
August 4, 1949 Acheson circulated a memorandum predicting that the Na-
tionalist redoubt would fall to the Communists because American economic 
and diplomatic weapons would no longer be strong enough to stem the tide. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on August 16, and reiterated their earlier 
view that open American military intervention in the defense of the is-
land would not be justified. In September, the Chiefs considered, and 
decided against, sending a military mission to the island to investigate 
matters. On October 12 5 members of the Defense and State Departments 
finished a new survey of the island's prospects; they unanimously opined 
12 
that it would fall to the Communists in 1950.18 
The Shaping of Disengagement 
On December a, 1949 the Nationalists abandoned the mainland and 
announced the activation at Taipei, Formosa, of a temporary capital, 
A "last-minute" request was made to President Truman by the Joint 
"' 
Chiefs that a military fact-finding team be sent to Formosa, The re-
quest, supposedly "non=political" and submitted at the behest of Sec-
retary of Defense Johnson, was received by the President at Key West on 
December 17, and was immediately resisted by the State Department. 
While the formal presidential decision was not reached until a National 
Security Council meeting of December 29, Johnson learned at lunch with 
the President on December 22, 
••• that I had lost my fight on Formosa ••• I was told •• , 
that he wasn't going to argue with me about the military con-
siderations but that on policy grounds he would decide with 
the state department.19 
The efforts of Johnson, along with various leaders of Congress and 
citizens of national prominence, to get the United States committed to 
a policy of at least denying Formosa to the Communists were symptomatic 
of the "lower echelon" struggles which often occur as policy is being 
formulated prior to decisions by the final arbiter---this being the 
President in the case of United States policy. 20 
lB Ibid. , p. 3 6 2 o 
19Ibid., Po 363. 
20Kurt Londoni ~ Making .2!_ Foreign Policy (New York, 1965), 
p. 209. 
13 
In this instance of policy formulation struggle, the Department of 
State felt secure enough in its position to issue an information guid-
ance paper to its world-wide missions---and to departmental officers 
dealing with the domestic press--advising them to minimize the import-
ance of Formosa since there was rather broad administration consensus 
as to its imminent fall to the Communists. (See Appendix A). The guid-
ance memorandum, formally titled "Policy Information Paper~-rormosa," 
Special Guidance Number 28, dated December 29, 1949, though not made 
public at the time of its initial distribution, was apparently "leaked" 
to the press from General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo and soon be-
came a celebrated cause among those of the so-called China Lobby. Dur-
ing the height of the public debate on China policy, the critics of the 
administration claimed that it reflected official policy at the time of 
its inception and dissemination. Administration spokesmen, on the other 
hand, later denied that it represented any fixed official policy at that 
time. 21 In retrospect, it would seem that the memorandum, if not repre-
senting official presidential foreign policy, did indeed reflect the de-. 
sires and inclinations of those persons in the State Department, indeed 
in all of the government, who wished to see the abandonment of the Na~ 
tionalists take place. It is exceedingly difficult to understand how 
an instruction of such significance could be disseminated to the many 
United States diplomatic missions and later be denied as reflecting 
official policy. 
The National Security Council's decision, in December 1949, to re-
frain from sending a fact-finding team to Formosa was virtually the 
21Ballantine, p. 119. 
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capstone of the efforts of Secretaries Marshall and Acheson to disengage 
the United States from the failing Nationalist regime; however. the for• 
mal presidential announcement would come later. 
The period from 1949 to January 1950 is especially important with 
regard to our China policy because it is the time-span within which 
Communist forces completed their capture of the mainland and Chiang Kai-
shek's government fled to Formosa. This geographic division of the con-
tending forces placed the matter of whether to help defend Formosa in a 
new and compelling relief. What previously had been a question for 
mostly speculation and recrimination suddenly reduced itself to a vir-
tual "yes" or "no" type answer; and on the reply, to a large extent, 
would turn United States policies toward the Communists and National-
ists for some time to come. 
American policy on the mainland, then, had obviously failed in its 
efforts to reconcile the warring factions. That failure, and the re-
sultant questions posed by it, brought the status and disposition of 
Formosa once again to a point of prominence. 
It may be observed at this stage in the progression of Sino-Ameri-
can relations that the question of the offshore islands, naturally, had 
not yet emerged. Neither, however, is there any evidence available to 
suggest that those advocates of American involvement in the defense of 
Formosa had given the matter any consideration to this time. The mili-
tary situation, however, was so fluid in 1949 that it was widely taken 
for granted that the Communists would experience little difficulty in 
seizing all of the historically Chinese islands immediately adjacent to 
the mainland. Hence, no valid reason for any policy planning was 
apparent. 
CHAPTER II 
TRUMAN: DISENGAGEMENT AND REVERSAL 
From Mainland Disaster to War in Korea 
The expulsion of the Nationalists from the mainland, as was noted, 
placed the question of Formosa defense in such clear relief that the 
matter could no longer be sidestepped. Also, it probably seemed a pro-
pitious time, to the administration, to place the capstone on the edi-
fice of disengagement that Secretary Acheson had been so busily building 
since assuming office on January 21, 1949 as successor to George c. 
Marshall. 
On January 5, 1950 an extremely significant policy statement on the 
matter of Formosa was issued by President Truman. 1 After an initial ref-
erence to the long-standing Open Door policy toward China, the Cairo 
Declaration, and the presence of Nationalist authority on Formosa since 
its reacquisition by China in 1945, he elaborated on what would hence-
forth be American policy toward the island: 
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or 
on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no de-
sire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish 
military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any 
intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the 
1Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic 
Documents, II (Washingtong Government Printing Office, 1~57), pp. 
2448-2449. Hereafter cited as Basic Documents. 
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present situation. The United States will not pursue a course 
which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China~ 
Similarly, the United States Government will not provide 
military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the 
view of the United States Government, the resources on For-
mosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which 
they consider necessary for the defense of the island. The 
United States Government proposes to continue under existing 
legislative authority the present Economic Cooperation Act 
program of economic assistance. 
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That same day, Secretary Acheson held a news conference "at the re-
quest and at the direction of the President" in order to provide back-
ground and any needed clarification of the President's remarks. In the 
conference, he maintained that the President had really said little that 
was new and that what was intended was to bring "clarity out of confu.,.. 
sion." He noted that it would have been preferable to have had full 
discussions with members of both parties in the Congress before the is-
suance of the Presidential statement, but justified the action on the 
ground that it was more important to "clarify thinking" than, at that 
time, to attempt to engage in 11consulations Lwith the Congres'27. 11 After 
reviewing earlier United States policy, he reiterated that it was not 
"new policy" and added that he knew of "no responsible person in govern-
ment, no military man /who7 has ever believed we should involve our 
- -
forces in that island." Finally, he insisted that the problem of defend-
ing the island did not turn upon material considerations but was of a 
psychological nature: " ••• it is not the function of the United States ••• 
nor will it or can it ••• furnish a will to resist ••• to those who must pro-
vide for themselves. 112 
President Truman's disengagement declaration and its buttressing 
2nepartment of State Bulletin, XXII, Jan. 16, 1950, pp. 79-81. 
Hereafter cited as Bulletin. 
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by Secretary Acheson found, of course, little favor with the Republican 
···~ 
opposition in Congress. Senator Taft said that the decision not to 
employ American forces in the Far East to fight the spread of Communism 
was highly inconsistent with what we were doing in Europe. 3 
The attacks by Senators Taft, Vandenberg, Smith, and others, were 
met with vigor by the defenders of the administration's policies. Sen-
ator Connally was especially critical of those Republicans pushing for 
a military stand on Formosa. On January 9, he cautioned: 
I am going to review this matter from time to time. When-
ever this subject is brought up again, I am going to want to 
know who are the Senators who want to plunge this country into 
war--not directly to do so but to risk doing so--in the name of 
bitter attacks on the President and the Secretary of State. 4 
The "peace offensive" of the Democrats struck a responsive chord 
in American public opinion. An aura of pure partisanship seemed to sur-
round the Republicans, especially when one considers the presence in 
their front ranks of such customary isolationists as Hoover and Taft 
demanding "extreme" military measures to counter the Communist threat. 5 
Press and public opinion aligned themselves incre,asingly against 
the suggestions of direct military support of the Nationalists on For-
mosa. Adding to the strength of the administration's "non-intervention" 
policies was the appearance before the National Press Club in Washington 
on January 12, 1950 of Secretary Acheson. He once again outlined our 
traditional policies toward China and emphasized that the fall of Chiang 
Kai-shek could not be considered to have resulted from an insufficient 
3Ballantine, p. 121. 
4Westerfield, p. 365. 
5Ibid. 
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American effort. To him, the policy of territorial integrity for China 
applied not just to foreign nations generally, but specifically to its 
most outspoken proponent, i.e., the United States. He stated as a prime 
necessity the need "to keep our own purposes perfectly straight ••• and 
not get them mixed up with the ••• attempt to do one thing and really 
achieve another." Replying indirectly to Senator Taft and others who 
criticized the "inconsistencies" of United States policy in opposing 
Communism in Europe but failing to do so in Asia, Acheson said it was 
a fallacy to think that the pursuance of American interests should re-
sult in a policy program so inflexible as to preclude the adaptation of 
such policy to local or areal needs. A final foundation stone for Ameri-
can disengagement from the Nationalists was provided in his description 
of what constituted the American defense perimeter in the Pacific area. 
He traced the United States' line of defense from the Aleutian Island 
chain, southward through Japan and Okinawa, and finally to the Philip-
pines.6 
During the spring of 1950, the widespread debate on Formosa con-
tinued, but its intensity abated. Additional statements reinforcing 
the position of the administration's course were made, but they were 
largely repetitive or elaborative of preceding statements by Secretary 
Acheson. 
Testifying before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign 
Relations Committee of the Senate on July l, 1951, concerning United 
States policy toward Formosa from October, 1948 to June 27, 1950, 
Secretary Acheson described such policy as containing four essential 
6Bulletin, XXII, Jan. 23, 1950, pp. 111-118. 
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elements, viz.~ (1) American recognition that Formosa had a strategic 
importance for the United States; (2) that this called for denying For-
mosa to any unfriendly power, but not for American occupation or use of 
the island; (3) that the force levels of the American military establish-
ment did not, during that period, permit the commitment of any forces 
whatever to the defense of the island; and (4) the Department of State 
was to do its best, by diplomatic and economic means, to prevent the fall 
of the island into unfriendly hands. 7 
The inconsistencies between Acheson's statements at the hearings 
and his earlier disclaimers of Formosa's value to the United States is 
not easy to explain. The most distinct impression left by his testi-
mony was that he tried to publicly minimize any possible earlier policy 
miscalculations of the administration. 
The role that Congress played in assisting in the formulation of 
China policy in the period from the end of World War II to the beginning 
of tpe Korean Conflict was not known for its perspicacity or dynamism. 
Certainly there were numerous public statements made and positions taken 
both for and against certain of the policies of the administration. But 
just how much influence did the Congress exert when the more fundamental 
considerations presented themselves, e.g., the defense of Formosa? This 
is a question to which probably no hard and fast answers can be provided, 
even in retrospect. Perhaps, however, a statement by Senator Brian 
McMahon, made "without fear of contradiction" after he re-read the secret 
7u. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee on Armed 
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations. Military Situation 
in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office1""i.1'srr;-pp. 1671-1672. Hereafter cited as Military Hearings. 
transcripts available to the executive sessions of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in the period from 1947 to 1949, sheds some light: 
In the years between 1 47 and '49 there was not a single 
solitary suggestion made for the forma1,ion of £.Olicy, change 
of policyJl.. or disagreement of policy Lon Chin!!.7 by any member 
of this /Senate Foreign Relations7 committee in its executive 
sessions7B -
According to Ho Bradford Westerfield, the spring of 1950 saw our 
China policy stopped on dead center. He further contended that: 
••• the policy stalemate was in effect contributing to a 
continuation of the 11wait-and-see," "do-nothing" conduct of 
American relations with China for which the administration 
had long been condemned. To be sure, there still was •• oa 
serious argument, from the standpoint of prudent diplomacy, 
for thus ''waiting for the dust to settle" a little more; the 
true strength and character of Red China might yet be reveal-
ed with greater clarity. But the fact remained grave that the 
years of accumulated partisan suspicion had virtually des-
troyed all freedom of choice in any direction. 
Clearly in Washington the passage of time was not bring-
ing the administration any closer to securing a free hand to 
pursue a new Far_ Eastern policy. Most people still believed, 
however, that in Asia the day was drawing near when the prob-
lem of Chiang Kai=shek would be wiped away by a Communist 
invasion of Formosa.9 
Policy Reversal and Commitment of Forces 
The widespread belief that the Formosa "problem" would be conve-
niently disposed of by Communist conquest of that island was quickly 
dissipated upon the advent of the Korean War. On June 27, 1950, two 
days after the North Korean Army had plunged across the 38th parallel, 
President Truman issued a statement which revealed a major shift in 
United States policy. That _portion of the pronouncement applicable to 
8Ibid., p, 19060 
9westerfield, pp, 367~369. 
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Formosa followsg 
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt 
that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to 
conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion 
and waro It has defied the orders of the Security Council 
of the United Nations issued to preserve international 
peace and securityo In these circumstances the occupation 
of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to 
the security of the Pacific area and to the United States 
forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in 
that area. 
Accordingly, I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent 
any attack upon Formosa. As a corollary of this action I 
am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease 
all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th 
Fleet will see that this is done, The determination of 
the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of 
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or 
consideration by the United Nations.10 
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In a message to the Congress on the Korean problem on July 19 1 the 
President elaborated on his statement of June 27th. He said once again 
that America had no territorial or other ambitions in Formosa. Most of 
all, we wanted Formosa to remain uninvolved in any hostilities that 
might occur in the Pacific area; similarlyi all questions regarding the 
island should be settled in accordance with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. He characterized the military neutralization of the 
island as being without prejudice to later settlement of the political 
questions involvedo 11 
· During July and August, Taipei was the destination of several high-
ranking American visitors. General Douglas MacArthur's visit there on 
July 19 was followed by Sino=American pronouncements that the defense 
of Formosa had been made a joint affair. The arrival of MacArthur 9 s 
deputy chief of staff~ General Fox, signified the establishment of a 
lOBulletin, XXIII, Jul. 3, 1950, p. 5. 
11Ibid.t July 31, 1950, PPo 165-166. 
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permanent military liaison with the Nationalist Government.12 
President Truman attempted even further clarification of the Ame~i-
can position on Formosa when he dispatched a letter to Ambassador Warren 
R. Austin, United States envoy to the United Nations, on August 27, 1950. 
The prime purpose of the letter was to re-emphasize the impartiality of 
the American decision to neutralize Formosa and to try to convince the 
world that it did not mean a blanket endorsement of Chiang Kai-shek and 
his hegemony on the island. Among other things it stressed that the 
American action was without prejudice to the future political status of 
Formosai such status not being affected "until there is international 
action to determine its future." It was also a simultaneous effort to 
try to preserve at least a modicum of flexibility for future United 
States policy with respect to the Formosa problem.13 
The reversal of the administration's earlier policy gained momentum 
as the United States became more deeply involved in the Korean War and 
firmer positions were successively taken. This crystallization of policy 
was well illustrated by the, remarks delivered by Dean Rusk, Assistant Sec• 
retary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on May 18, 1951 to members of the 
China Institute. In his allusions to American policy toward Formosa he 
said: 
We recognize the Nationalist Government of the Republic of 
China even though the territory under its control is severely 
restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the 
views of the great body of the people of China, particularly 
their historic demand for independence from foreign control. 
12Ballantine, p. 129. 
l 3Public Papers of The President: Harry s. Truman, 1950 (Washing-
ton: Government Print!ng(51'f!ce)i p .• 599. Hereafter cited as President's 
Papers. 
That government will continue to receive important aid and 
assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, 
however~ such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of 
China. The decision and the effort are for the Chines people! 
pooling their efforts, wherever they are 9 in behalf of China. 4 
Whether this speech by Mr, Rusk reflected the official policy of 
the United States was assessed by Joseph w. Ballantine as follows: 
This was taken to be the equivalent of an announcement 
that the United States was unequivocally supporting the Nation-
alist Government of China.,,.There was, however, no official 
repudiation of Mr. Rusk's statement. The presumption remained 
that it refl~cted a considered official position.ls 
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Looking back over the developments of 1950-51, Ballantine maintain-
ed that the three key factors determining United States policy with re-
gard to the Nationalist Government of China and the denial of Formosa 
to the Communists were " ••• the state of American public opinion, the 
outbreak of the conflict in Korea, and the intervention of the Chinese 
Communist regime in that conflict. 1116 Underscoring the shift of policy 
in a very substantial way was the resumption of arms shipments to the 
Nationalists and the dispatch of a sizable military mission to Taipei 
upon the intervention of the Chinese Communists in late, l 9}in, 17 
The former United States ambassador to Nationalist China, Mr. Karl 
L. Rankinj said mid=l950 was a significant turning point in the American 
attitude toward Formosa. According to him " ••• we took a positive ap-
proach ••• 11 the result of which placed our actual programs for Formosa 
on a ",.,comprehensive, medium-to=long=term basis •• , 11 He said the most 
14Bulletin, XXIV, May 28, 1951, pp. 846-848. 
15Ballantine~ pp. 131-132. 
16Ibid., p. 130. 
17rbid., p. 131 
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outstanding changes in the development of United States policy toward 
Formosa in the eighteen months following the interposition order of June 
27• 1950 were: 
(1) the allocation of approximately fifty million dollars 
in equipment and supplies for the Chinese Army on February 16• 
1951; (2) the communication to the Chinese government on April 
20, 1951, that a Military Assistance and Advisory Group would 
be established on Formosa; (3) the allocation on June 21, 1951• 
of nearly forty=two million dollars in additional economic aid 
to be obligated in the last days of fiscal year 195li (4) the 
passage of the Mutual Security appropriations in October, 1951 
which included totals based on estimates of some three hundred 
million dollars in aid for Formosa in the fiscal year 1952.18 
The Mechanics of Reversal 
It is apparent from evidence already examined that the policy of 
disengagement announced by President Truman was one not easily arrived 
at and not widely acclaimed for its dynamism, However, McGeorge Bundy, 
in his The Patterns E£,. Responsibility, said that such ". , • policy may be 
subject to debate and difference, but it can hardly be claimed that it 
was either pro-Communist or meaningless.n19 
Without an examination of the merits of the policy that was public-
ly and officially in effect from January 5, 1950 to ,June 27, 1950, there 
remains the consideration of how and why the President, in two days time 
(25-27 June), reversed the United States' stand of non-intervention in 
the matter of Formosao There is no doubt that the principal event which 
prompted the President to react was the initiation of hostilities by the 
18Rankin, p. 123. 
19McGeorge Bundy$ The Patterns.£! Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass., 
1952), p. 191. 
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North Koreanso The attack by the North Koreans, even though it occurr-
ed in a location approximately ltOOO miles distant from Formosa, and 
against an area earlier excluded from the American defense perimeter, 
resulted in an immediate change in the military balance in the Far East. 
It was only prudent for the presidential advisors to take into account 
the moral support of the North Korean action by Communist China and to 
adjust their military posture accordingly. The memoirs of President 
Truman provide valuable and illuminating details of this policy change. 
His summarization of the factors and his personal decisions, upon being 
informed of the North Korean assault~ are quoted, in part, below: 
I asked Acheson to get together with the Service Secre-
taries and the Chiefs of Staff and start working on recom-
mendat£_ons for me when I got back Lfrom Kansas Cit~. _ 
/After returning to Washington on Sunday, June 25, 1950/ 
I then called Acheson to present the recommendations which the 
State and Defense Departments had prepared. He presented the 
following recommendations for immediate action: 
1. That MacArthur should evacuate the Americans from 
Korea ••• 
2. That MacArthur should •• ,get ammunition ••• to the 
Korean Army ••• 
3. That the Seventh Fleet should be ordered into the 
Formosa Strait to prevent the conflict from spreading to that 
area •••• We should make a statement that the fleet would repel 
any attacks on Formosa and that no attacks should be made from 
Formosa on the mainland. 
After this report I asked each person ••• to state his 
agreement or disagreement ••• /There was/ complete, almost un-
spoken acceptance ••• that whatever had-to be done to meet this 
aggression had to be done. 
I then directed that orders be issued to put the three 
recommendations into immediate effect. 
/On Tuesday 1 June 27/ I asked a group of Congressional 
leaders to meet with me so I might inform them on the events 
and decisions of the past few days.,. 
I asked the Secretary of State to summarize the situa-
tion. 
I pointed out that, so far as our action concerned For-
mosa9 we were acting on our own and not on behalf of the 
United Nations. 
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The Congressional leaders approved of my actions, 20 
Following the meeting with the Congressional leaders, the President 
issued a press statement containing the items he had discussed with them 
and his advisors, 
There is nothing in Mr, Truman's account of the decisions to reverse 
the non=intervention policy to suggest that he rejected any of the pro-
posals he had requested from the officials in the State and Defense De-
partments, Neither is there a hint that any of his decisions placed be-
fore the members of Congress were seriously disputedp much less rejected 
by any of them. The unanimous acceptance of these proposals would sug-
gest thatg (l) the over=all recommendations concerning Korea were~ to 
United States policymakers at least, the right ones; (2) that the recom-
mendations on Formosa brought it, finally, under the protection of our 
oft=repeated policy of containment; and (3) that this line of thinking 
was, in factt but a reflection of the consensus held by those so appris-
While both the decision toresist in Korea and to interpose in the 
Formosa Strait must be regarded, substantively, as reactions to Commun-
ist=initiated moves, there exists evidence that these aggressive moves 
were not the cause for the formulation of the 11containment" of Commun-
ism Policy in Asia 9 but merely the trigger to a philosophy earlier hy-
pothesized by the Truman administration in the event of such contingen= 
cies. Such evidence was provided by Bundy when he discussed in detail 
the instructions given Mr, Phillip C. Jessup on July 18, 1949, when the 
20Harry S, Trumani Years of Trial~ Hope, II (Ga'X'den City, N.Y., 
1956)i pp, 341-348. 
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latter was directed by Secretary Acheson to carry out a 11 ••• comprehen-
sive review of the problems of policy in the new situation in Asia ••• " 
According to Bundy, Jessup received a top secret memorandum which said, 
in part: 
You will please take as your assumption that it is a 
fundamental decision of American policy that the United States 
does not intend to permit further extension of Communist 
domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asian 
area ••• 21 
One might observe therefrom that Acheson's "top secret" containment 
assumption of Julyj 1949 did not harmonize very well with President Tru-
man's dissociation=from-China statement of January 5, 1950 and Acheson's 
own "perimeter" speech. It must be kept clearly in mind, however, that 
regardless of what policy the United States might have wished to pursue 
'' 
in regard to the Communists in Asia, there was not really much that 
could be done without a provocation or turn of events of the first mag-
nitude. The Korean War 1 fortunately or unfortunately, provided the in-
gradient that was heretofore missing. And so was implemented a policy 
which had undoubtedly received much private reflection prior to the 
actions of the North Koreanso In fact, our ambassador to Formosa, Karl 
Rankin, observed thatg 
Our government was by no means entirely unprepared for the 
new responsibilities it assumed toward Formosa ••• there had been 
thinking and planning too~ of the kind which before the event 
is labeled "top secret.n2£ 
21Bundy, p. 1800 
22Rankin, p. 1210 
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Consideration of the Offshore Islands 
What discussions, if any, took place during the Truman administra-
tion concerning the offshore islands? 
A thot>ough review of the public statements, speeches, and reports 
of President Truman from 1945 through 1952 revealed no mention by him 
of the offshore islands, either collectively or by group, such as Quemoy, 
Matsu, Chusan, or Nanchi,23 Neither was there mention in Ambassador 
Rankin's work of any United States concern over the offshore islands 
through 19520 
In Mro Truman 9 s memoirs, Years ;?!_Trial~ Hope, there is but one 
mention of any of the offshore islands. This concerned Quemoy and was 
only noted because it was included in a report submitted to the Presi-
dent by Mro Averell Harriman after the latter's conference with General 
MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6, 1950. Mro Harriman elaborated on Mac~ 
Arthur's trip to Taipei of a week earliero The General, according to 
Harriman, said the following about the island~ 
He spoke about the problem of the island of Quemoy, close 
to the mainland, The Generalissimo claims to have 70,000 men 
there which is important from the standpoint of eventually 
landing on the mainland but has no value to the United States, 24 
From the foregoing it may be concluded that as of the end of 1952, 
the issue of the offshore islands had not yet emerged in palpable form, 
Similarly, though, it becomes apparent that the foundation was being 
laid for American involvement in the defense of Formosa and the sub-
sidiary problems generated by such a stance, Of these various problems, 
23President's Papers, 1945=52, 
2"}Tr•uman si p, 353 ~ 
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the issue of what to do about the offshore islands has perhaps received 
the most notoriety, albeit as noted, on a rather temporary and super-
ficial plane. 
How the offshore island difficulty manifested itself and how it be-
came embedded in our China policy became apparent as the American policy 
toward Formosa and the Nationalists experienced finalization and formali-
zation under the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
CHAPTER III 
EISENHOWER: FORMALIZATION AND CONFRONTATION 
The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President in 1952 presaged 
a formalization of United States policy on Formosa and an even more in-
tense application of the containment policy. 
President Eisenhower's tenure, for the purposes of this study, was 
highlighted by: (1) the delegation of broad authority in the field of 
foreign affairs to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; (2) the re-
vision of the mission of the Seventh Fleet; (3) the Korean Armistice; 
(4) the negotiation of a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of 
China in 1954; (5) passage of the 1955 Formosa Resolution; (6) the 
clear-cut emergence of the offshore island problem; (7) a succession 
of crises in the Formosa Strait; and, (8) a rather compliant Congress 
in the matter of formulating China policy. 
The Influence of John Foster Dulles 
The role and authority of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 
foreign policy making must be clearly understood; it was, in the opinion 
of some, perhaps unique in the annals of American statecraft. Rexford -
G. Tugwell, in ~ Enlargement 2!_ !!!! Presidency, said " ••• it was not ••• 
novel for weak Presidents to devolve upon a strong Secretary of State 
the direction of policy." In the case of Eisenhower's delegation of 
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authority, however, he was quite outspoken in terming it excessive and 
said that 
••• never, in determining policy, had there been the de-
ference shown to an individual not President that was shown 
to Dulles. Several times his attempts at containment of 
Russia and, after China had become a monolithic communist 
camp, his affronts to that government that, in spite of him, 
existed, led almost to attacks on the nations he so abhorred. 
It was a curious exhibition of Christian righteousness--
Dulles was a prominent Presbyterian larnan--which would have 
seen violence used without hesitation. 
According to him, President Eisenhower supposedly intervened at 
the last moment against these adventures and refused to permit the em-
ployment of military force. However, Dulles was permitted to continue 
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creating incidents leading to the verge of disaster and so rightly earn-
ed the title of being a master of "brinkmanship." 
By Tugwell's description, "The Congress was futile," He attribut-
ed this partly to the fact that the Democrats, out of power, were aware 
that the Dulles policies had begun when they had possessed the responsi-
bility. His denigration of the role played by Congress in foreign re-
lations during Eisenhower's time in office was capped with the statement 
that 
There never was a better demonstration that the making of 
foreign policy belonged inescapably to the President, even when 
delegated by him to another. It seemed improbable that the 
Congress, even if it should try, could ever recapture it. 2 
Herman Finer seemed to have entertained a similar feeling about the 
role of Secretary Dulles as a policy originator and approver. He offer-
ed the hypothesis that 
1Tugwell, p. 463. 
2Ibid. 
All those men who have been acclaimed as great Presidents .. 
have served as their own Secretary of State in foreign affairso 
They permitted the Secretary of State to handle, on the whole• 
only minor executory matters ancillary to the high decisions 
which they themselves determined to be their own responsibil-
ityo3 
He concluded that President EisenhowerYs laudation of Secretary 
Dulles as the greatest Secretary of State in his memory was a most 
"unhistoric judgment" and that such eulogy merely revealed that Eisen .. 
bower did not properly understand his own duties as President in the 
field of foreign affairso There is little doubt as to what Finer be-
lieved was proved when his hypothesis was put to the test. Obviously 
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referring to Eisenhower, he said that "only a weak President allows his 
Secretary of State to make foreign policy." 
It i~ a widelyQheld view that John Foster Dulles was indeed a Sec= 
retary of State who enjoyed power and prestige of a magnitude probably 
exceeding that of most of his predecessors. Whether the phenomenon of 
a "strong" Secretary of State automatically results in, or is a reflec-
tion of, a 11weak" president would seem at best debatable. Most often, 
it seems, historyvs verdict of the competency of an administration's 
foreign policies has turned upon the success or failure of the policies 
pursued==not upon who, in a formalistic sense, originated them. 
Nevertheless, according to Kurt London in The Making .2£_ Foreign 
Policy, the delegation of power to Secretary Dulles was the exception 
to long=established precedence. Dulles " ••• was his own master most of 
the timeo 114 
3Herman Finer,~ Presidency (Chicago, 1960), p. 90, 
4 Landoni Po 145. 
President Eisenhower, in his Waging Peace, takes direct exception 
to the allegations that Secretary Dulles enjoyed virtual free reign in 
foreign policy formulation and the decisions that must go with it. In 
the chapter devoted to the late Secretary, the President said: 
He was called legalistic, arrogant, sanctimonious, and 
arbitrary-~but such descriptions never occurred to those who 
knew Foster Dulles as I did. It was also said that he sought 
not only to be influential in the conduct of foreign affairs, 
but to be responsible only to his own convictions and inclina-
tions. What his critics did not know was that he was more 
emphatic than they were in his insistence that ultimate and 
personal responsibility for all major decisions in the field 
of foreign relations belonged exclusively to the President, 
an attitude he meticulously maintained throughout our service 
together. He would not deliver an important speech or state-
ment until after I had read, edited, and approved it •••• It 
was the mutual trust and understanding, thus engendered, that 
enabled me, with complete confidence, to delegate to him an 
unusual degree of flexibility as my representative in inter-
national conferences ••• he was the adviser, recognizing that 
the final decisions had to be mine, 
••• He was sometimes considered by strangers as abrupt, 
even brusque. This often made him the target for the venom 
of smaller men, especially anyone who felt slighted by his 
serious, almost sharp form of address. 5 
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Some further perspective of Mr. Dulles' role as Secretary of State 
may be gained from the transcript of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee hearing of January 15, 1953. The session interviewed him in his 
status as Secretary of State-Designate and noted that he was not an of-
ficial nominee at that time since such nomination could not be made un-
til the President=Elect, Eisenhower, was himself sworn in. Mr. Dulles' 
performance was so creditable, in fact, that no protest was made when 
Senator Taft offered his "understanding" of the hearing: 
My idea of the proceeding in this committee is that when 
this proceeding is over, the committee will authorize the 
5Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, N. Y., 1965), 
pp. 363-365. 
chairman to state on the floor of the Senate, at the time the 
nomination arises, that the committee no longer desires fur-
ther hearings and that, if the nomination were referred to 
them, the committee would recommend the confirmation of 
Mr. Dulles.6 
Whatever the judgment of publicists and others in retrospect, we 
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have at least Mr. Dulles' public comments in 1953 as to how he would try 
to fulfill his role as Secretary of State. He told the committee: 
Now of course you understand that as a member of the 
Cabinet and as Secretary of State, I will not make independ-
ent policies for the Executive. The principle job of the 
Secretary of State is to advise the President, and it is he 
who makes the final decisions about foreign policy, and what-
ever my own individual views in that respect would be, I 
would as the part of good teamwork, hope to be able to work 
and expect to be able to work in the closest cooperation with 
General Eisenhower in those respects.7 
Nor was the Secretary-designate reluctant to state his appraisal 
of what our policy should be on trying to check, even to roll back, the 
Communist threato In effect, he suggested meeting them in their own 
milieu. His concept of the problem was stated as follows: 
I ask you to recall the fact that Soviet communism, it-
self, has spread from controlling 200 million people some 7 
years ago to controlling 800 million people today, and it has 
been done by methods of political warfare, psychological war-
fare, and propaganda, and it has not actually used the Red 
Army as an open aggressive force in accomplishing that. 
Surely what they can accomplish, we can accomplish. 
Surely if they can use moral and psychological force, we 
can use it; and, to take a negativist and defeatist attitude 
is not an approach which is conducive to our own welfare, or 
in conformity with our own historic ideaso8 
Dulles gave all the 01 correct 0 answers during his· appearance. 
6uo s. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Nomination£!. John Foster Dulles~ Secretary~ State-Designate, 83d 
Cong., 1st Sess:-fWashington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 17. 
7Ibid., p. 21. 
8Ibid., p. 6. 
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Whether he was properly subordinate to the President in the matter of 
formulating foreign policy is a matter of opinion and conjecture--as we 
have seen. 
One accusation was never aimed at Mr. Dulles and probably never 
will be: that he was weak or uncertain in his own mind as to how the 
United States should deal with the threat posed by Communist expansion. 
Revising the Mission of the 7th Fleet 
One of President Eisenhower's early actions was the so-called "un-
leashing" of Chiang Kai=shek. Popularly, he had been "leashed" when 
President Truman ordered the interposition of the 7th Fleet in 1950. 
On February 2, 1953 the Chief Executive noted in his State of the 
Union message why he had revised the mission of that fleet. The Presi-
dent said there was 
••• no longer logic or sense in a condition that required 
the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibility on 
behalf of the Chinese Communists. 
He emphasized that this was not to be interpreted as aggression on the 
'part of the United States, but merely a recognition that "we have no 
obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea. 119 This decision 
by the President had little immediate military consequence. Such a 
change by a Chief Executive who had campaigned to end the war in Korea 
was not unexpected. 
Karl Lott Rankin's account leaves one with the impression that the 
episode of "interposing" and "withdrawing" the 7th Fleet was, to a large 
, 9Presidentvs Papers, 1953, pp. 16-17. 
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extent, a psychological ploy. !n 1951, he said that he was "not satis-
fied with the preparations to defend Taiwan" and that "Not infrequently 
during the Korean War no American naval vessel was seen within several 
hundred miles of Taiwan, 1110 He had occasion to discuss Taiwan defense 
with John Foster Dulles while on a visit to Washington in February, 
1951. Rankin said he found in Dulles, when weighing the merits of pos-
sible Chinese Nationalist landings in South China to support our oper-
ations in Korea, "that he favored a policy of action. 1111 His observa-
tions at this point were a reliable index to the militant policies that 
Dulles later pursued with respect to some of the offshore islands. 
Rankin later emphasized the distinctly unilateral manner in which 
the United States first "leashed" and then "unleashed" the Nationalists, 
He said that the 1950 decision was taken without any prior consultation 
with the Nationalists, but that this might have been justified due to 
the extreme fluidity of the situation at that time. However, the Ameri-
can action in February, 1953 was similarly precipitous--to the point of 
being reported extensively in the newspapers several days before Rankin 
had an opportunity to consult or inform Chiang Kai-shek.12 
It· was Rankin's further observation that the revision order to the 
fleet was taken by the Nationalists as 11 suggesting the possibility of 
American support for offensive action on their part." To preclude any 
such misinterpretation on the part of the Generalissimo, Rankin spoke 
to him; his account of this is as follows: 
10Rankin, pp. 83=84. 
11Ibid O t p O 95 0 
12Ibid., p, 155, 
I therefore took the occasion of my call on President 
Chiang Kai""shek to as.k that no such action be initiated by his 
armed forces, particularly if aircraft or armor were involved, 
without consulting with the senior American military officer 
on-Taiwan, General Chaseo He readily agreed. To this extent 
was the Chinese government "unleashed"--unfortunate word--and 
a moment later, nneutralized" once more.13 
The statement by Rankin was probably valid--insofar as offensive 
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forays on the mainland were concernedo The matter of strength build-ups 
on the offshore islands was a different subject however. Tang Tsou said 
of that: 
When the Eisenhower administration took office Dulles' 
ideas /on unleashing Chiang Kai-shek7were translated into 
official policies. Al though no formal "warrant" was given 
to Chiang, the pressures exerted by the United States Mili-
tary Assistance and Advisory Group on Nationalist officials 
to strengthen the garrisons /on the offshore islands7was 
subsequently considered by the Nationalists as a moral com-
mitment to defend the islands.14 
As was previously noted, General MacArthur reported to Averell 
Harriman as early as 1950 that there were some 70,000 Chinese National-
ist troops on Quemoy aloneo Various writers have since attempted to 
depict the alleged number of troops on the offshore islands on a kind 
of scalar device o By using this "device'' theoretically one can then 
arrive at a measure of American policy at any given time. When the 
author was assigned to Air Task Force Thirteen in Taipei during the For-
mosa Strait crisis of 1958, one of the favorite pastimes of Americans 
there was to estimate the number of troops on Quemoy and the other off-
shore islands. To his knowledge, few persons in American circles were 
ever really certain of the force levels. It apparently was a rather 
13Ibido 
14Tang Tsou, pp. 6-7. 
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well-kept Chinese Nationalist statistic at that precise timeo 
In a communication of February 3, 1953, to the Department of State, 
Ambassador Rankin provided what probably were reliable figures on troop 
dispositions on the offshore islands. He said that the forces station-
ed on Kinmen, Matsu, and the Tachen Islands totaled about 75 1 000. At 
the same timei he noted there were about 500,000 troops on Formosa and 
the Pescadores. 15 One may deduce, after calculating the number of 
troops later withdrawn from the Tachens (14,000), that there probably 
were at least 60,000 troops stationed on Quemoy and Matsu in early 1953. 
Formalizing Defense Relationships 
Although the Sino=American Mutual Defense Treaty was not negotiated 
until 1954, thus throwing the offshore island problem into sharp legal-
istic relief, the first hints that the islands would soon become a mat-
ter with which the Americans would have to deal come from Ambassador 
Rankin in 19530 16 In June of that year he said that 11 ••• a grave situa-
tion was in prospect on the ••• offshore islands," in that the Chinese 
Communists had begun strengthening their forces on the mainland opposite 
the islands since the truce negotiations on the Korean hostilities had 
begun. After discussing the problem briefly with Chiang Kai-shek, Ran-
kin said the Generalissimo "asked me to transmit three requests to the 
State Department." These requests askedi (1) that renewed consideration 
be given to the formal integration of the islands into the defense system 
15Rankin, Po 1520 
16Ibid., p. 167. 
39 
of Formosa and the Pescadores (Penghu); (2) that an immediate expression 
of American interest in the islands be made; and (3) that certain shal~ 
low draft boats be made available to him for use in the offshore island 
areas. 17 
Ambassador Rankin assured Chiang Kai-shek that his requests would 
be transmitted but advised him that it involved "important questions of 
policy" and not to expect quick results, In the meantime, he advised 
the Generalissimo " ••• there might be an attack Lon the island!7' at any 
time and the Chinese should not look to us for assistance on short no-
tice / 1 
While he did not think it wise to say so flatly at the time, Rankin 
doubted "that the United States would commit itself d.it>ectly in the de-
fense of Tachen"==the most northerly group of offshore islands and then 
the most vulnerable, because of inadequate preparation for defense. 
In February, 1953, the ambassador had recommended that early con-
sideration of United States desires "as to bilateral or multilateral 
agreements affecting the Government of the Republic of China and/or For-
mosan be undertaken. He felt the absence of any "formal and continuing" 
American commitments made all United States programs tentative in nature 
and tended to produce diffidence in Nationalist planning circles.18 
Later that year, he noted, the Chinese approached him with a draft for 
a bilateral treaty with the United States. The draft followed rather 
closely the provisions of the Philippine-American agreement. Rankin 
suggested that their ambassador in Washington give a copy to the 
17Ibid., pp. 168=169. 
18Ibid., p. 154. 
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Department of State for studyo This was done in October 1953. Though 
formal negotiations did not begin until several months later• "the pro-
• t f t f t l d f b k f that t1'me. 1119 Jee o a trea yo mu ua e ense egan to ta e orm at 
Rankin's opinion 5 in April 1954, that "insufficient attention" was 
being given to the offshore islands 1 probably reflected a desire on his 
part to see the treaty negotiations speeded up. He accordingly asked 
Secretary Dulles in a dispatch of April 21 1 whether the United States 
was willing to use American naval and air forces to defend them 
.,,or shall we simply dare the communists to attack them 
and risk their loss in the near future with consequent damage 
to the defenses of Formosa and serious loss of face byboth 
Free China and the United States?20 
Negotiations on the treaty proceeded during the spring and summer 
of 1954 with most of the delay being attributable to~ (l) questions of 
scope, i.e •• would the Americans agree to help protect the various off-
shore islands; and, (2) what should be done about territory Taipei might 
later recover from the Communists, 21 
On September 3, 1954 the Communists began a heavy artillery bombard-
' 
ment of Quemoy and so began the sporadic series of barrages which served 
to bring the offshore islands into public prominence from tim~ to time 
over succeeding years. As far as can be ascertained, the 1954 bombard-
ment was the first significant effort by the Communists against Quemoy 
since the close of the mainland campaign and represented not only a probe 
of the Nationalists spirit of resistance but probably a test of United 
19Ibid., p, 186, 
20Ibid,, p~ 193. 
21 Ibid. 1 p. 195. 
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States intentions as well, 
Earlier, in October 1949, the Communists had launched an estimated 
30,000 troops against the island from Amey, about six miles distant, but 
had be,en repulsed with heavy losses. 22 From that day until the present 
the Communists have never mounted any sizable amphibious troop assaults 
against the major offshore islands. 
With the Quemoy bombardment providing a backdrop, Secretary Dulles 
stopped by Taipei on September 9, 1954 on his way from the Manila Con-
ference, During his visit Rankin observed that the "sympathetic ••• atti-
tude which he showed toward the Chinese.,,served our cause in Formosa 
very well. ••• " The senior American military officer on Taiwan, General 
Chase, recommended to Dulles that the United States "announce our inten-
tion to help the Nationalists defend the offshore islands." Rankin, 
however, advised the Secretary that some of the islands probably were 
militarily indefensible and that such a blanket assurance would not be 
desirable. The Ambassador "thought it would be best to keep the Com-
munists guessing, and to give authority to United States military corn-
manders to extend assistance wherever it was considered necessary and 
desirable, most likely in the form of air support from carriers. 1123 
Unfortunately, Rankin gave no details of Dulles' response, if any, to 
the suggestion proffered him. Later events proved, however, that he 
tended toward Rankin's view, 
During the visit a discussion ensued about the scope of the pending 
treaty and Rankin told Dulles that the treaty, in his opinion, should 
22H. McClair Bate, Report From Formosa (New York, 1952), p. 50. 
~
3Rankin, p. 206. 
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specify only Formosa and the Pescadores by name but could also extend• 
"subject to mutual agreement, to any territory which is now or may here-
after be under the control of the Government of the Republic of China. 1124 
As we shall later see, his recommendations were rather closely followed 
in the final draft of the treaty. 
With the general level of tension still remaining high in the For-
mesa Strait, the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty was finally signed 
in Washington on December 21 1954. Ratification of the treaty was ad-
vised by the Senate on February 9, 1955 and ratification by the Presi-
dent occurred on February 11, 1955. The exchange of ratifications took 
place at Taipei on March 3, 1955 and the agreement came into force on 
that same day. According to Rankin, "The Republic of China had its 
treaty at last, and the United States had, among other things, a sub-
stantial basis for a positive and continuing China policy, 11 25 (See Ap-
pendix B). 
The agreement between the two nations pledged each to assist the 
other in the event of an attack on the territories stipulated in the 
treaty; such assistance was not to be automatic but "in accordance with 
its /each signatory's7 constitutional processes." A further manifesta• 
- -
tion of the United States' effort to maintain the whip hand in dealing 
with the problem of possible unilateral Nationalist military excursions 
against the Communists was reflected in an exchange of notes between 
the two countries on December 10, 1954. Each therein agreed not to use 
force from the area specified in the treaty without joint agreement with 
24Ibid., p. 207. 
25Ibid., p. 214. 
the other. The existence of these restrictive notes was emphasized by 
the Senate when it advised ratification. 26 
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In an attempt to keep its hand in the matter of policy formulation, 
the Senate conveyed its express understanding to the President that any 
effort to extend United States defensive responsibilities beyond Formosa 
and the Pescadores, i.e., to the offshore islands, would require "the 
advice and consent of the Senate. 1127 
The new treaty, then, clearly signified that the United States had 
decided to firmly back the Government of the Republic of China and would 
consider it, henceforth, an important segment of its chain of defenses 
in the Western Pacific area. 
Both the statement of Secretary Dulles before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on February 7, 1955 and the report submitted by that 
committee to the Senate on February B, 1955 reflected a close rapport as 
concerned the objectives and rationale of the treaty. 
In urging the treaty's approval by the Senate, Secretary Dulles had 
said that 
It would give the Chinese Communists notice, beyond any 
possibility of misinterpretation, that the United States would 
regard an armed attack directed against Taiwan /Formosa/ and 
the Pescadores as a danger to its own peace and-safety-and 
would act to meet the danger~-such action to be in accordance 
with our constitutional processes.28 
For its parti the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded in 
its report to the Senate that 
26Basic Documents, pp. 947=949. 
27 Ibid., p. 962. 
28Ibid., p. 955. 
By doing this in terms which cannot be misunderstood 9 it 
is hoped that the Communist military regime will be deterred 
from further attempts to aggrandize its position in the Far 
East at the expense of the free world. 29 
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The hearings on the treaty were conducted in closed session. Con-
siderable debate on the floor of the Senate took place on February 9th 
and six Senators, led by Morse and Lehman, argued against the treaty on 
legal, constitutional, and political grounds. The proponents of the 
treaty prevailed, however, and the final vote was 65 yeas, 6 nays, and 
25 not voting. Among those not voting were then-Senators Lyndon B. 
Johnson and John F. Kennedy. There is no indication in the Congression-
al Record that either offered any comment on the Senate floor regarding 
----
the merits or demerits of the pending treaty. 30 
Developing a Policy 
The Sino~American treaty provided the executive department the 
authority it judged it needed to deal with the central problem of Tai-
wan 1 s defense. Particularly pleasing to all concerned, it seemed, was 
the provision for a rather leisurely process of "mutual agreement" if 
things grew too pressing in and around the offshol"e islands themselves. 
Chinese Communist actions against the islands, however, were to intro-
duce an element of urgency that, in the assessment of the administration, 
could not be dealt with by attenuated talks and negotiations but, in-
stead, called for presidential authority to make quick evaluations and 
rapid decisions~ 
29Ibid. 9 p. 965, 
30cong. Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), p. 1416. 
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The upshot was a request to Congress by President Eisenhower on 
January 24, 1955 calling for authority to employ United States armed 
forces in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores as he might deem fit 
and necessary. The President said he was .not proposing to enlarge Ameri .. 
can defense obligations beyond Ftiri'hosa and the Pescadores " ••• as provided 
by the treaty now awaiting ratification" but that it was necessary to 
take into account closely related positions, i.e., the offshore islands, 
which might have a direct bearing on the failure or success of an assault 
on the treaty territories. The President spoke of his authority as Com-
mander-in=Chief in a most diplomatic manner. He noted that he had sub-
stantial inherent powers as chief of the military forces but felt that 
" ••• a suitable congressional resolution would clearly, •• establish the 
authority of the Commander=in=Chief to employ the Armed Forces ••• for the 
purposes indicated ••• if in his judgment it became necessary." The Presi-
dent emphasized that the requested authority was no substitute for the 
treaty under consideration. He further noted that the threat might be 
temporary in nature and recommended that the resolution expire as soon 
as the President was able to report that peace and security had been re-
established in the area.31 
31Ibid., II, pp. 2483=2486. Speaking of Eisenhower's request to 
Congress for approval of the Formosa Resolution, the former President's 
personal assistant, Sherman Adams, said that~ "Eisenhower was well aware 
that as President he already had the power to go to war against the Reds 
without consulting Congress. I remember his making a careful change in 
the message that he sent to the Capitol with the intention of making this 
point very clear. 
In the original draft of the message prepared by the State Depart-
ment there was a sentence that said, 'The authority I request may be in 
part already inherent in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.' Eisen-
hower crossed this out and wrote in its place, 'Authority for some of the 
actions which might be required are inherent in the authority of the Com-
mander~in ... chief. '" Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report g !h! Story £!. the 
Eisenhower Administration (New Yorki 1961), p. 128. 
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The alacrity with which the Senate acted is attested by the dates 
involved. Senate authority and acquiescence came on January 29, 1955, 
just four days after the submission of the request. The authorization 
granted in full all of the President's requests. There were only three 
dissenting votes on the resolution. 32 (See Appendix C) 
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that then-Senators John 
r. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson also failed to take part in the Senate's 
floor considerations of the Formosa Resolution. Similarly, neither was 
present to cast a yea or nay vote on January 29.33 
The actual consideration of the Formosa Resolution was superimposed 
upon the Senate's hearings on the proposed Sino-American defense treaty, 
which had been submitted to the Senate on January 5, 1955. 
Expressing his satisfaction on the Congressional actions, Secretary 
Dulles said in a radio address on March 8, 1955 that 
The political decision of what to qefend has been taken. 
It is expressed in the /Mutual Defense7Treaty and also in the 
law whereby Congress has authorized the President to use the 
Armed Forces of the United States in the Formosa area. That 
law is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores •. However, the 
law permits a defense which will ·be flexible. 34 
The hearings Jn the Formosa Resolution took place in closed session; 
the minutes have not been released to this date. It is possible, how-
ever, to gain a good over-all,"grasp of what was placed before the Sena-
tors by reading the remarks from the floor considerationso In sum, these 
32Ibid., PL 2486. 
33 Cong. Record, 84th Cong 09 1st Sess. ( 1955), p. 994. 
34Department of State, "The Quest for Peace," Publication No. 6931, 
General Fq:reign Policy Series. No. 111 (Washington: Government Printing 
Offld-, Seffe., 1956), p. 10. 
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considerations revealed that the administration quite probably: 
(1) was convinced that it had to have interim "authority" to pro-
tect Formosa and the Pescadores, strategic islands in its Western Pacif-
ic chain of defense, from what is considered to be imminent danger from 
the Chinese Communists; 
(2) felt that it should have the option of selecting which, if any, 
of the offshore islands it should encourage the Chinese Nationalists to 
hold or evacuate; 
(3) believed that such authority as contained in the Resolution 
would give the Communists pause to reflect before proceeding to further 
threaten the offshore islands and Formosa; 
(4) entertained ideas that the offshore islands might be useful in 
later attempts to trade to the Chinese Communists for at least a modus 
vivendi in the Taiwan Strait; 
(5) wanted authority to smash any incipient Communist invasion plans 
against Formosa--even if this meant using American aircraft against enemy 
targets located well inland. 35 
It has been contended by some that Chiang Kai-shek used the guaran-
tees of both the Formosa Resolution and the Sino-American Treaty as ve-
hicles by which to militarily entangle the United States with Communist 
China. Whether he later believed he was accomplishing this by certain 
of his actions is really of little moment here. It is vitally necessary, 
however, that·a clear understanding be had of what was the United States' 
position in late January, 1955 regarding Nationalist efforts to hold 
certain of the offshore islands. 
35Cong. Record, 84th Cong., 1st Seas. (1955), pp. 600-994. 
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The American position was rather clearly put by the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator George, on January 28, 1955, 
as he was shepherding the Formosa Resolution (later formalized as Public 
Law 4) through floor debatei 
The Republic of China is holding military planning in sus-
pense until the United States position is made clear by this 
resolutiono That means that the build-ups by the Chinese Com-
munists are not, while matters are thus in suspenset being 
matched by corresponding dispositions on the part of the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China,36 
It must be appreciated that Senator George presided over the closed 
hearings on the Resolution and that the witnesses included, among otherst 
the Secretary of Statet the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
representatives from the National Security Council. From this it may 
be confidently assumed that Senator George was fully apprised of the 
administrations 1 s line of strategy and its immediate intentions concern-
ing the strengthening of the offshore islands' defenses. Most obvioust 
of courset was his veiled implication that the Nationalist defense build-
up on the islands would proceed at full speed once the measure was passed 
and American intentions of support had become "clear." 
The terms of the treaty itself and the "flexibility" Secretary 
Dulles ascribed to the resolution passed by Congress were put to the test 
during the first two months of 1955. It is especially important to gain 
insight into administration actions during this period with regard to 
the offshore islands policy. As noted earliert the Nationalists held 
some 30-odd of these islands upon their retreat to Formosa in 1949. It 
is, therefore, a necessary exercise to determine what was the policy 
36Ibid. , p. 92,9. 
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followed by the United States when some of the islands were actually as-
saulted or put under such pressure by the Communists that the National-
ists were either defeated in battle or forced to make a strategic with-
drawal. 
On January 18, 1955 a determined amphibious assault was launched 
by the Communists against the islet of Ichiang, located a few miles north 
of the Tachen island group, which, in turn, is located about 200 nauti-
cal miles northwest of Formosa. It was obviously a test of Sino-Ameri-
can intentions since the only practicable relief was by air forces. No 
aerial support was provided by either the Nationalists or the Americans 
and the island fell after about two days of battle. 
The United States response to the fall of Ichiang and the continued 
threat to the Tachen group was a proposal for their evacuation--with 
American naval and air assistance. 37 
On the same day that Ichiang fell, Secretary Dulles held a news 
conference in the course of which the relation of the Tachen Islands to 
the defense of Formosa was discussed. In a direct reply to a question 
as to the essentiality of the Tachens to the defense of Formosa and the 
Pescadores$ the Secretary replied that "I would not say that the Tachen 
Islands are in any sense essential to the defense of Formosa and the 
Pescadores, which we do regard as vital to us. 1138 
In consequence of the American decision not to assist in the de-
fense of the Tachen Islands, the Nationalists agreed on February 5, 1955 
to the American proposal for evacuation. The withdrawal of the 
37Rankin, pp. 220-221. 
38Basic Documents, II, p. 2482. 
approximately 14 1 000 troops and 16,000 civilians was well under way by 
February 10 9 1955 0 39 
The next group of M9-tionalist-held islands to the south of Tachen 
was Nanchi~-about 75 nautical miles nearer to Formosa than the former 
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group. United States personnel on Formosa believed it would be advisable 
for the Americans to be prepared to assist in providing air and naval 
support to hold Nanchi and the remaining groups of Matsu and Quemoy. 
The embassy at Taipei advised Washington of this appraisal and forwarded 
recommendations on February 10 1 1955.40 
On February 22, the Chinese were informed " ••• that the United States 
would not assist them in the defense of Nanchi," They thereupon decided 
that holding the islands would place too great a strain upon their re-
sources. Within a few days of receipt of the Washington decision, the 
Chinese Navy evacuated the 4,000 troops and 2,000 civilians who had oc-
cupied the islands.41 
It is clear from the foregoing that definite public decisions about 
the defense of certain of the offshore islands were taken in early 1955 
and that the authorities in Washington had not used the Formosa Resolu-
tion as a S'llln'k check with which to become involved with the Chinese 
Communl$tS. It is to be noted that in·none of these instances (Ichiang, 
Tachens, Na;nchi) had ··public .pronou~ceinent by--the· admini-stration about 
these islands been ambiguous or contradictory. Rather an attitude of 
straightforward decision was the rule in these first "test" cases. 
39 Rankin, p. 22l. 
40Ibid., pp. 222-223. 
41Ibid. 
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The tension in the Strait continued during the summer of l955i lat-
er American efforts were made in the United Nations, and at Geneva and 
Warsaw, to get a formal cease-fire arranged with the Communists but noth-
ing worthwhile came of them. 
The offshore problem was to be absent from the headlines until the 
autumn of 1958, at which time the severest confrontation and test of 
policies was to occur. 
During the intervening years nothing was done to dispel the public 
vagueness and ambiguity surrounding American policy toward the remaining 
offshore islands. Indeed 9 according to Secretary Dulles, nothing should 
be done. At a news conference on April 5, 1955, he summed up the poli-
cy of the United States at that time as follows: 
oooWe have no commitment of any kind ••• which binds the 
United States to anything except the defense of Formosa and 
the Pescadores •• o.Some people say we should announce in ad-
vance precisely how we are going to defend ••• Formosa and 
the Pescadores.o •• Once you extend your commitment to defend 
Formosa to a commitment to particular means ••• then you are 
getting into very difficult ground. But nobody yet has re-
quired us to state publicly precisely what the means would 
be of defense in the event of certain types of attack which 
cannot be predictedoooo 42 
Although Secretary Dulles 1 remarks left America's public position 
on the defense of Quemoy and Matsu in a state of uncertainty, there is 
evidence to show that the United States was not only not going to seri-
ously hamper any Chinese Nationalist build-up on the islands, but would 
indeed aid and abet such efforts. In this vein, Ambassador Rankin not-
ed on March 29 1955 that 
The Chinese were reinforcing and improving the defenses 
of the remaining and far more important offshore islands so 
42Bas..!£ Documentss II» po 2495. 
that they could repel all but the very heaviest assault, We 
would work ever more closely with them in their military 
planning, and be better prepared ourselves in consequence. 43 
Further underscoring United States approval of Nationalist defense ef-
forts on the offshore islands was a telegram from Secretary Dulles to 
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President Chiang Kai-shek, on May 3 1 1955 via the ambassador. The mes-
sage informed the Generalissimo that the United States·uriderstood his 
position with reference to the defense of the offshore 1fslands. He was 
further advised that he would " ••• continue to enjoy strong United States 
support."44 
Sherman Adams observations about how the administration handled the 
offshore island problem on a day-to•day basis lends strong support to 
the assumption that the policy itself was essentially crisis-oriented, 
He quoted Eisenhower as sayingg 
Foster /Dulles7 and I are living 24 hours a day with the 
question of what todo if something happens in Quemoy and 
Matsu. That is the most difficult problem I have had to face 
since I took office.45 
There is no evidence available to suggest that the administration's 
day-to-day thinking changed much between 1955 and the crisis in late 
1958. 
It will become apparent later that Secretary Dulles' policy of 
studied public enigmatism would prove difficult to maintain during the 
most violent of the offshore island crises. 
43 Rankin, p. 228. 
44Ibid. 
45Adams, p. 132. 
Quemoy: A Policy Rechallenged 
As noted previously, fundamental United States policy authority 
regarding the defense of the offshore islands was established in 1955 
by the Formosa Resolution and undergirded by the Sino-American treaty_ 
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of that same year. That year also witnessed the first.test of American 
intentions. It is only reasonable to infer from the treatment we accord-
ed the Nationalists when the problem of Ichiang islet, and the Matsu and 
Nanchi groups arose, that the United States did not view these holdings 
as vital to the defense of Formosa. Or, for that matter, and more di-
rectly, neither were they vital to the security of general United States 
interests in the Western Pacific. Perhaps it would be more precise to 
say that the President himself was never convinced of the need to hold 
these islands-~for it rested upon his final judgment, as authorized in 
the Formosa Resolution, to decide whether to employ American forces. 
Thus, upon the initiation of the Communist bombardment in 1958, the 
United States did indeed have a policy toward the offshore islands: it 
was a "policy" of calculated ambiguity and one that would have to await 
each individual challenge before the object of the policy could hope to 
learn its genuine contents. 
The massive artillery bombardment of Quemoy began on August 23, 
1958 and was carried out by an estimated 200 to 500 cannons located on 
the nearby island of Amoy and the mainland proper. The guns could reach. 
every part of Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the nearby islets of Ta-tan and 
Ehr-tan. Though there was no concentration of landing craft noted, the 
Communists had 50 to 80 motor torpedo boats in the area which could be 
used against Nationalist resupply efforts. During the first three weeks 
of the interdiction they employed mostly anti-personnel rounds. About 
the middle of September, the Communists turned to barrages from higher 
calibre (in excess of 200-mm) guns using delayed action fusing in an 
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attempt to penetrate and destroy the more permanent works on the island. 
During the height of the interdiction effort the number of rounds expend-
ed during a given day's firings sometimes exceeded 50,000. 46 The Com-
munists never employed aerial bombardment against Quemoy at any time 
during the crisis, but did engage in some strafing attacks against Na-
tionalist resupply craft on September 18--three days after such craft 
had made their first large resupply run to the island. The shepherding 
of these runs by United States warships to the three-mile limit of Que-
moy's territorial waters began on September 7, but they were not sue-
cessful until as noted above. Toward the end of September, the Nation-
alists announced that resupply, due to improved techniques, was no long-
er a problem and the defenders could, logistically at least, hold out 
indefinitely. 
The Communists announced a unilateral cease-fire on October 6; the 
cessation was to last one week and was conditioned upon the discontinu-
ance of American naval surface escort for the Nationalist convoys. On 
October 25, a bizarre, "even=numbered days" respite was proclaimed by 
the Communists 9 i.e., the bombardment would thereafter be carried out 
only on odd~numbered days. 
During November, the tension waned as the Communists reduced their 
firings to a mere nuisance level. By the end of December, many of the 
46It was a gratuity to the defenders that many of these proved to 
be duds. Later information revealed that much of the ammunition stocks 
used were of Soviet World War I.I origin. 
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American military forces sent to Formosa and surrounding areas under the 
pressure of crisis were on their way back to their normal duty stations, 
The foregoing is, of course, only a very brief account of what 
transpired in the Formosa Strait area during the months of August through 
December, 1958. A full description of all the military and other aspects 
of that period is appropriate neither to the space limitations nor to the 
purpose of this study, What is germane is a careful examination of high-
level American actions and pronouncements during this time-span in order 
to determine what genuine policy changes, if any, occurred as a result of 
the crisis. 
Virtually coincidental with the initiation of heavy shelling, Sec-
retary Dulles had occasion to state the administration's position about 
the matter of possible Communist aggression against the offshore islands, 
Replying to an inquiry by Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the House Foreign 
Affairs Cammi ttee about a reported force build-up opposi t.e the islands, 
he said on August 23: 
As you know, these islands have been continuously in the 
hands of the Republic of China, and over the last four years 
the ties between these islands and Formosa have become closer 
and their interdependence has increased. 
I think it would be highly hazardous for anyone to as-
sume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change 
this situation by force and now to seek to attack and conquer 
these islands, that could be a limited operation. It would, 
I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area. There-
fore, I hope and believe it will not happen. 47 
The "close ties" of which Dulles spoke were re-emphasized by 
President Eisenhower in a news conference just four days later. The 
President, it seemed, was even a bit more definite than his advisor; 
47Bulletinj XXXIX, Sep. 8, 1958, p. 379. 
he said: 
/The offshore islands7 have this increased i~portance: 
what we call the NationalTst Chinese have deployed about a 
third of their forces to certain of the islands ••• and that 
makes a closer interlocking between the defense systems of 
the islands with Formosa •••• Before ••• they were ••• thought 
of as outposts ••• Now, apparently, the philosophy /of the 
Nationalists7 is to hold the whole thing. -
••• we are supporting the Nationalist regime ••• we are 
not going to desert our responsibility or the statements we 
have made. 48 
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A gratuitous invitation for the Department of State to show an even 
firmer connection between the defense of the islands and Formosa was 
given by the Chinese Communists on August 27, 1958. On that date, Pe-
king Radio rebroadcast an earlier statement by the Fukien Military Com-
mand (opposite Formosa) that "The Chinese People's Liberation Army has 
determined to liberate Taiwan, a territory of the fatherland, as well 
as the offshore islands and the landing on Quemoy is imminent," The 
monitored.broadcast's contents were contained in a State Department news 
release of the next day, along with appropriate comments about Commun-
ist intentions. 49 President Eise·nhower said in his Waging Peace that 
the announcement.by the Chinese worked to his advantage and that if they 
' attacked the offshore islands as a declared preliminary to moving on For-
mosa "under the Formosa Doctrine we could instantaneously come to the 
tactical aid. of the Nationalists. 1150 
At Newport·. Rhode Island, on September 4, the White House releas~d 
a rather lengthy official appraisal by the Secretary of State of the 
48PI'!esident 1 s Papers, 1958, pp. 641=644. 
49Bulletin~ XXXIX, Sep. 15, 1958 1 p. 415. 
50Eisenhowe~ 9 p. 298. 
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situation in the Formosa Strait. He really said little new except to 
reveal that "Military dispositions have been made by the United States 
so that a Presidential determination Lthat such forces are needed to de-
fend Formosa/, if made, would be followed by action both timely and 
-
effective. 115l 
Tang Tsou said that the vague denials by Secretary Dulles at New-
port that the President had not yet reached a decision to intervene 
under the Formosa Resolution were unconvincing and that the statement 
represented the nailing of the American flag to Quemoy. 52 He said furth-
er that a later background briefing held at Newport to clarify some of 
the Secretary 9 s remarks were " ••• interpreted by everyone to mean that a 
decision had been reached to defend Quemoy and Matsu if the Nationalist 
garrisons there proved unequal to the task." Tsou completed his remarks 
on the conference with the conclusion that "With this official statement 
and the background briefing 9 the United States moved to the brink of 
war. 1153 
Walter Lippmann, writing during some of the most crucial days of 
the bombardment, indicated his dissatisfaction with the administration's 
policy judgments when he commented, on September 18, that: 
We have been maneuvered into a position where the question 
is not whether we will defend Quemoy •• .,but whether we will make 
war against the China mainland. Was this maneuver foreseen 
when John Foster Dulles persuaded the President to stake Ameri-
can prestige on the defense of Quemoy? ••• There is reason to 
doubt whether the President and Dulles and their military ad-
visors had fully realized that Quemoy could be blockaded by 
51Bulletin, XXXIX 5 Sep. 22, 1958, pp. 445-446. 
52 Tsou, p. 18. 
53 Ibid., p. 19. 
artillery fire from the mainland. There is strong evidence 
that the commitment to defend Quemoy was made before the plan 
to defend Quemoy.1154 
President Eisenhower s'l!lid his own outlook at that time regarding 
the possible breaking of the artillel'y blockade was "optimistic" and 
58 
that the main l'eason for the'Newpol't declal'ation was to l'eassu?'e Chiang 
Kai-shek and to make " ••• our position cleal' befol'e the world. 1155 
On September 9, Secretary Dulles met the press and again discussed 
the pl'oblem of Quemoy and Matsu, this time emphasizing their significance 
to the United States, he said& 
••• What is involved, and what is under threat, is the en-
tire position of the United States and that of its free-world 
allies in the Western Pacific, extending from Japan, Korea, 
Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, on down to Southeast Asia • 
••• And we have to conduct ou?'selves in relation to that situ-
ation, not as though little bits of it could be segregated 
and treated as isolated problems to be dealt with entirely on 
their own • 
••• But we cannot just say, through Presidential action, 
that we will defeni• come what may.!. under any and all circum-
stances, an area /Quemoy and Mats~ which is beyond that to 
which we are commTtted by the treaty. This can be done only 
if there is a relationship between the two at the time in 
question • 
••• /The evacuation of the Tachen Islands in 19557was 
done under circumstances which did not involve that threat 
/to our position in the Western Pacific7. The facts speak 
for themselves, that our analysis of the situation was 
correct. 56I believe our analysis of this situation is also 
correct. 
The attempt by the Secretary to attribute the administration's am-
biguity about taking a definite stand on the defense of the offshore is-
lands to a lack of authority under the 1954 treaty was only too true. 
54Wal ter Lippmann• "Predicament at Quemoy," ~ ~ Herald Tribune, 
Sep. 18, 1958 5 p. 20. 
55Eisenhower, p. 29~. 
56Bulletin, XXXIX, ~ep. 29, 1958 1 pp. 486-492. 
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However 9 it was possible for anyone to see that the Formosa Resolution 
provided all the "authority" necessary to take a definite stand. Again, 
it is clear that the administration did not want to make a firm commit-
ment but at the same time was apparently unwilling to accept the proposi-
tion that the decision was wholly its own responsibility to make. 
During the time between the initiation of Communist pressures and 
September 11, the date of an all-major network address by the President 
to the American public, several decisions were reached by the adminis-
trationo These make intriguing reading when viewed against the radio-
TV address and the attempts at studied ambiguity found in so many of the 
"discussions"· with the press. Mr. Eisenhower detailed some of these de-
cisions under the heading of "assumptions" in his memoirs. e.g.: 
We assumed under the circtttnstances of the moment we would 
probably have to come to the aid of our ally. Chiang, no mat-
ter when an assault occurred ••• To save the offshore islands 
against a first phase attack limited initially to those is-
lands alone, a lesser response would be required and would 
conform to the terms of the Formosa Resolution. 
For our part, once we had intervened with major mili-
tary forces to save Quemoy 1 we would accept nothing less than 
victory •• o.We recognized, however, that to succeed we might 
face the necessity of using small-yield atom'ic weapons again-
st hostile airfields.57 
The President explained the reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons 
as being necessitated by the wide dispersion of Communist airfields in 
Southeast China--a dispersion we could not cope with by conventional 
means alone because of the number of aircraft it would require. An 
awareness of possible adverse world react~on from the implementation of 
such plans was indicated but heid to be an indivisible part of the cal-
culated rbko 
57Eisenhower, Po 295. 
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According to the President, he and the Secretary of State edited 
and agreed upon a memorandum that spelled out the official line of rea-
soning that would be followed if matters continued to deteriorate in 
the Strait 11 oooto insure that there was no discrepancy in our think-
• 1158 ing. 
The foregoing suggests that the administration had in actuality 
decided privately to assist in the defense of the offshore islands on 
a virtually instantaneous basis. About the only "unknown" was precisely 
when this would occur. The President discussed some of the complexities 
of command and timing, saying: 
Throughout this whole period it seems that I was continu-
ally pressured--almost hounded--by Chiang on one side and by 
our own military on the other requesting delegation of author-
ity for immediate action to United States commanders on the 
spot in the case of attack on Formosa or the offshore islands. 
On September 6, a request came from theJoint Chiefs of Staff 
asking authority for the u. s. Air Force to support the Chin-
ese Nationalist Air Force in the event of a major landing at-
tack on the offshore islands. In potentially explosive situ-
ations and with attendant communications only vaguely under-
stood, such delegations were at times necessary. But for 
this case I insisted that I would assess developments as they 
occurred. Therefore~ I kept to myself the final decision to 
employ Uo So forces. 9 
The President's difficulties were further compounded when he re-
ceived 11 on September 11 9 on the eve of his network address, a note from 
Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy telling him that the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had shifted their position. According to McElroy, the military 
chiefs now felt that Quemoy and Matsu should be vacated--or lightly 
manned as outposts onlyo The President added the remark that this had 
58 Ibido This paper may be read in its entirety under Appendix D 
heretoo 
59Ibid., po 299. 
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long been desirable from a technical military standpoint. 60 
The matter of numbers seemed to be a favorite subject with numerous 
officialso It is difficult to fully understand how the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff could now assume a new stance, i.e., advocate vacation of the is-
lands or a vast reduction in the number of troops there, unless indeed 
it represented a change from a preceding position. Obviously, the ear-
lier outlook called for holding the islands, wnich would have required 
very sizable troop dispositions. Similarly, a call for reduction of 
the island garrisons to outpost functions couJ,.d,only. imply that a much 
more important role for them had been the earlier attitude of the Joint 
Chiefs. What is significant here is that there seems to be a contra-
diction between the Joint Chiefs of Staff' recommendations on Septemper 
11th and the policies they must have been promoting the day before and 
indeed the year before. 
President Eisenhower maintained that Chiang Kai-shek had earlier 
ignored " ••• our military advice ••• " by adding personnel to the Quemoy 
and Matsu garrisons. 61 There is, howevefi, little evi<;ierice available to 
suggest that the Eisenhower administration ewer· made any r.eally force-
ful attempts to get Chiang to reduce the size of~hls garrisons. The 
statements by the former United States ambassador to Taiwan, Karl 
Rankin, lend credence to the assumption that the United States followed 
a policy of urging the strengthening of the islands' defenses, at least 
until a very short while before the 1958 crisis. 
Significant. too, is the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
GOibid., pp. 300-301. 
61E' h 293 1sen ower, p. • 
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apparently did not change their attitude until about September 11th. 
If this was truly the case$ one can readily imagine just how 'a!!siduously 
the personnel in the Military Assistance and Advisory G!'oup, Taiwan, and 
the Taiwan Defense Command cultivated any kind of force reduction phi-
losophy among the people they were advising, i.e., the Nati6na.lists. 
One also might observe that if the President had firmly made up his mind 
as early as he implied that he did, he would hardly be !'eb-elving mes-
sages from his military subordinates that they now felt inclined to 
agree with himo 
Tang Tsou dealt rather lengthily with numbers in his analysis of 
the 1958 crisiso He made the point that between the fi!'st part of 1955 
and August 1958, that Chiang Kai-shek inc!'eased the garrisons on the 
offshore islands until there were 90,000 men on Quemoy alone. In doing 
this the Generalissimo allegedly expended about $500,000 9 000.00--a rathe!' 
considerable sum of money and presumably mostly of American origino 62 
Whether this was really an increase of such criticality as made out 
by nume!'ous persons may be judged by a comparison with earlier figures 
provided by Ambassador Rankin, under whose authority the advisory com-
mands on Taiwan functionedo He said 1 as earlier noted, that there were 
about 75 9000 troops on the offshore islands in early 1953. MacArthur 
had placed 70,000 on Quemoy alone as early as 1950. By comparing Ran-
kin's figures with the ones cited by Eisenhower and others 9 bn~ per= 
ceives a total increase of approximately one=third in about five and 
one-half yearso This does not seem to represent such a startling change 
considering the time=span involved and the apparent desires, during 
62 Tang Tsou, PPo 15=17. 
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Rankin 9s tenure on Taiwan (1952=1957) 9 to see the Nationalists firmly 
hold the Quemoy and Matsu groupso Also, major attentfpn was paid to the 
supposed 90 9 000 troops on Quemoy-=yet the contingency planning of Pres!-
dent Eisenhower as shown in Appendix D would have called for the same 
response if anything serious happened to Matsu--where only 10,000 troops 
were supposedly stationed. 
The President 1s nationwide address of September ll, marked the high-
point of public statements about what the Americans might do if Quemoy 
or Matsu were assaultedo The most revealing passage occurred when he 
said that 
oooit is clear that the Formosa Strait Resolution of 1955 
applies to the present situationo If the present bombardment 
and harassment should be converted into a major assault with 
which the defenders of Quemoy could not cope, then we would be 
compelled to face precisely the situation that Congress visual-
ized in 19550 
There is not going to be any appeasemento I believe that 
there is not going to be any waro63 
Although there were additional statements made by administration 
spokesmen as the crisis continuedi they were mainly repetitive or elab-
orative of the earlier positions taken by the President or Secretary 
Dulles. 
Precisely what does the foregoing analysis of policy statements 
reveal? Did the United States pronouncementsj as Tsou and Lippmann por-
trayed them 9 definitely commit us to the defense of the offshore islands 
and therefore bring us to the brink of hostilities with China? The 
analysis conditionally supports these conclusions. There can be no 
doubt that the American policy statements hardened; but they lacked 
63aulletin~ XXXIX, S~p. 29, 1958, pp. 481-484. 
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that final and full public commitment==which is indeed what the admin= 
istration tried its hardest to stay away fromo Also 9 the memoirs of 
President Eisenhower revealed the seriousness with which he viewed the 
problem and the contingency responses that might have been implemented. 
However 9 they also revealed that he refused to make an unqualified pre= 
commitment 9 even to his most senior and experienced military advisors, 
as to what would be done as an immediate response to assaulto 
As to the seriousness of the overall confrontation, however, Tsang 
Tsou himself seemed to partly backtrack in his own conclusions when he 
saidg 
Looking back to Secretary Dullesv handling of the Quemoy 
crisis 9 one must admit that he was correct in his assumption 
that the Communists would not engage in a level of military 
effort which is likely to provoke a general war. Consequent-
ly9 one must further admit that ••• the danger of axtending the 
war was not very great. 64 
While reluctantly admitting the efficacy of the policy Dullesv 
pursued 9 Tsou remained highly critical of the tactics employed by the 
administration~ he saidg 
The sweeping proclamations witnessed during the Quemoy 
crisis did not contribute to political realism in American 
thinking and are bound to plague the United States in the 
future. They stood in sharp contrast to the quiet and matter= 
of=fact manner in which the Truman administration handled the 
Berlin crisis.65 · · 
A major criticism levelled at the policy statements implied that 
the United States took itself to a point of no return for insufficient 
reason; in other words 9 Quemoy and Matsu were not that vital to our 
interests. The drawback to this approach is that it so intertwines the 
64TsOU9 Po 37o 
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matter of objectives and tactics that a fair judgment of each becomes 
virtually impossiblea As a matter of facti judgments on the former are 
to a large extent matters of personal valuation and political orienta= 
tion; acceptable criteria by which one may reach a nsatisfactory" ex= 
planation on them are never possible to establish to the satisfaction 
of all concerneda The other aspect 9 tacticsi is a different subject 
entirelya It is clear from the statements of the administration, as 
well as the Commander=in=Chiefus memoirs that the tactic employed was 
one that sought to keep the likely enemy in a state of doubt about our 
ultimate intentiona It is likewise clear, however, as noted by Tsou and 
Lippmann that the administrationus vagueness was rather fully dispelled 
by its later "clarificationsan A key point made by the President in his 
broadcast of September 11, as well as in his memoir reference to dele= 
gation of military command authorityt was that he would have to face a 
decision under the Formosa Resolution if the Chinese Nationalist defend-
-
ex-s of Quemoy found they could not ncopen with a major assaulta Such 
9udefendersn included not just the combat t?'oops on Quemoy but all Chin= 
ese Nationalist air and naval forces that might be sent from Formosa 
propel' in the event of a serious attempt to take the offshore islandsa 
It b rather obvious why the President and Secretary Dulles had confi= 
dence in the outcome of the crisis and chose the coux,se they did~ the 
force balance was definitely on the Nationalist Chinese=American side 
in the area of c~iticalitya 
While the number of troops on Quemoy was on several occasions 
criticized by both the President and Dulles as being unduly large from 
a technical military standpoint, the fact remains that such disposition 
gave the Chinese Nationalists overwhelming superiority in surface forces. 
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Quemoy is only about fifty square miles in area; the reported 90 9 000 
troops Chiang had there provided roughly ltBOO soldiers per square mile 
for defensive purposes==a formidable figure indeedo The administration 
was also well aware that the Communists had never tried an amphibious 
assault against Quemoy since thei:r:, abortive attempt in October, 19490 
Also 9 the absence of any significant build~up of landing craft in the 
area during the entire crisis was fully known to the administration and 
very carefully watched as an early warning indicatoro Additionally» the 
tactical interdiction capability of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force 
was a distinct advantage if fleeting targets (landing craft) had to be 
dealt witho 
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the President, in spite of 
what his memoirs stated 9 had already "delegated" some reaction authority 
as early as the first week in Septembero The cruiser USS Helena, through~ 
out its convoy operations, was authorized to engage in full-scale sup~ 
pressant bombardment if interdiction efforts were effective against it 
during its acti6nso By United States interpretation, the Helena was 
always in international waters and retained its inherent right of self= 
defenseo United States combat air patrols» naturally, were kept away 
from the vicin;ty of Quemoy and Matsu; howeveri there was no doubt as 
to what actions they would have taken if any Communist aircraft had 
engaged them or attempted to penetrate t~e Taiwan Air Defense Zoneo 
It also should be borne in mind that there was a great deal of 
rather sensational publicity about the deployment of United States 
forces to the Strait areao Too often this has been interpreted as an a 
priori decision to intervene in the defense of the offshore islands on 
a moment 0s noticeo The President 0s refusal to delegate immediate air 
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reaction authority to Air Task Force 13 at Taipei provides an indirect 
comment on such assumptionso In the event of such assaults on Formosa 
proper 9 of course 9 America would have been morally obligated under the 
terms of the treaty of mutual defense to use its military forces for in= 
stantaneous responseo The fundamental purpose for the deployment of such 
forces was to insure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores; if a 
psychological bonus accrued to the Sino=American side because of this 
it certainly was not going to be rejected out of hand by the administra= 
tiono 
The assessment of United States policy statements in this period 
was rather well covered by Professor Henry A. Kissinger in !h! Necessity 
for £h_oiceg Prospec,!!.2£.American Foreign Policyo He Wl'ote that 
The dangers as well as the uses of deliberate ambiguity 
were well illustrated by the Quemoy crisis of 19580 At the 
beginning, we sought to leave the Chinese Communists in doubt 
as to whether we would resist an attack on the offshore is= 
lands. Both the President and the Secretary of State made 
statements that we would resist only if the Communist~s at= 
tack seemed a prelude to an assault on Formosa and the Pes-
cadoreso Since this implied that there were some attacks to 
which we would not respond 9 the impression was created that 
we might want to leave a loophole ·for yieldingo When Com= 
munist pressure continued 9 we were therefore forced step by 
step to depart from our original stand. Every succeeding 
statement made the American commitment to defend Quemoy more 
explicit. We went further and engaged in a series of actions 
whose only purpose could be to remove any doubt about whether 
there would be American resistanceg the transfer of United 
States tactical aircraft to Formosa, the convoying of Nation= 
alist supply ships to within three miles of Quemoy, the 
strengthening of United States naval forces in the Far Easto 
The ij~isis was thus ended 9 not by Communist uncertainty as to 
our decision to resist~ but by the strong likelihood that a 
fullbscale assault would meet with United States opposition. 66 
It may reasonably be concluded, then 11 <from the evidence of policy 
66Henry Ao Kissingeri !h!_Necessity ~ Choiceg Prospects 2!,_Ameri-
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statements and the personal memoirs of the Commander-in-Chief at the 
timei that the public policy of the United States during the 1958 episode 
remained fundamentally unchanged, i.e., no absolute precommitment emerg-
edo Whether or not the United States would intervene in support of the 
offshore islands defense would turn upon Chinese Communist actions. 
Their actions were not of such nature as to force the President to make 
an absolute public commitment. It is clear, however, that the President 
had placed himself in such a position as to make the withholding of 
United States assistance difficult indeed in the event of a heavy as-
sault. 
The question as to why United States policy remained ambiguous does 
not lend itself to an easy answer. During the floor debates on the For-
mosa Resolution 1 the proviso dealing with presidential authority to "se-
cure related positions" and to take other actions at his di:scretion came 
under a great deal of criticism and efforts were made to modify it be-
cause of the alleged dangers involved. All such attempts failed and the 
proponents insisted that the wording had been exhaustively studied 
before it was presented to the Congress and that not one word should be 
changed. 
Earlier in this thesis are listed several convictions the adminis-
tration probably held in January 1955, when it rushed the measure through 
under dire warnings of what might transpire if it did not get its way. 
There was no particular legal reason why the President could not 
have clearly included Quemoy and Matsu within an area the United States 
would defend in the period 1955-58. The point is that the President and 
his Secretary of State merely believed that their course of purposeful 
ambiguity was the correct one. It had worked well in the 1955-58. 
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interlude, why change it? 
T,he ambiguity of the policy was hardly "explained, 11 when the Presi-
dent said in his memoirs3 
! ••• interpreted the Congressional Joint Resolution back-
ing up the Formosa Doctrine as requiring me not to make absol-
ute advance commitments ••• but to use my judgment according to 
the circumstances of the time.67 
It was an unsatisfactory and evasive explanation because it attempted 
to identify Congress as the initiator of the ambiguity. Congress, of 
course 9 did no such thing; it merely stamped "approved" upon an admin-
istration idea. As to what policy would be in effect a week, a month, 
or indeed a year hence, was a matter for political judgment. The record 
shows only that the President chose not to make any unequivocal commit-
ment to defend Quemoy and Matsu between 1955 ~nd 1958. 
Sherman Adams, had certain observations to offer concerning the 
President 1 s attitudes and actions in the crucial 1954-55 period. Speak-
ing of the Presidentvs decision to maintain the United States' defense 
policy toward the offshore islands in a kind of planning limbo, Adams 
said there were several reasons for the position taken. Most important, 
however, the P~esident disagreed with his military advisors, who wanted 
a more precise statement about the islands. He was willing to use force 
if Formosa itself was threatened, but he was totally unwilling to be 
rushed into any full mobilization for war over some small islands near 
the China coast unless it was clear that the Communists were moving 
simultaneously to attack Formosa. 68 
67E' h 301 isen ower, p. • 
68 Adams, p. 128. 
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Post Quemoy Policy 
During the remainder of the term of President Eisenhower the off-
shore islands issue was quiescent. There was, of course, little reason 
to suggest changes upon a policy that had apparently been successful. 
Neither was there any ltdltation, at least publicly. that the adminis-
tration had done much to convince Chiang Kai-shek that he should reduce 
the Quemoy and Matsu garrisons to mere forward outposts, 
Professor Hans Morgenthau commented on the administration's polic-
ies following the 1958 Formosa Strait crisis. Before a Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee hearing on April 15~ 1959, the eminent political 
scientist said: 
When the location of the next crisis is virtually pre-
dictable, as with regard to the islands off the coast of 
Chinai we refuse to anticipate the crisis by appropriate 
action. 
We wait until it occurs and until we are confronted with 
an impending disaster. Then we react hastily and Jneffectively. 
To address myself more particularly to the problem of the 
offshore islands. When the last crisis broke out in the fall 
of last year~ we appeared ready to commit ourselves to a re-
duction of Nationalist manpower on those islands, but after the 
crisis subsided, manpower was but very slightly reduced and 
firepower is being drastically increased. 
Thus we •• invite a repetition of the crisis without having 
developed a policy with which we can successfully meet it, 69 
Professor Morgenthau was similarly critical of the way in which he 
felt the United States let its policies be determined by Chiang Kai-shek, 
He said the United States should concentrate upon denying Formosa to the 
Communists and should quit worrying about what particular political re-
gime on Formosa would be required to do that job. 
69u. s. Senatei Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
What. £!. Wrong !!!E_ ~ Foreign Policy, 8 6th Cong. ; · 1st Sesa. ( Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1959) 9 pp. 3-15. 
The successor to John Foster Dulles 9 Secretary of State Christian 
Herter 9 illustrated rather well the administrationus continuing polic= 
ies at a news conference on July 9 9 19590 At that time the Secretary 
said: 
oooAS far as I know there are no American commitments on 
those /offshore islands7o There has never been more than a 
small number of /Uo So7 observerso We have never had troops 
on those two islandso-
As far as I know, any commitment that we have==and I am 
speaking now from a legalistic or moral point of view-=has re= 
mained unchangedo The thinning out of the troops on Quemoy, 
particularly~ is something that was under discussion /in 1958/o 
Just what the figures are now 9 I couldn 9t tell you& but I -
understand that there has been some thinning outo7 
President Eisenhower once more discussed the significance of the 
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islands at a White House press conference on May ll~ 1960==his last full 
year in offic:eo It is clear from the excerpts that follow that the1 
situation in the Formosa Strait had returned to the status quo ante and 
that United States policy, as concluded abovei remained unaltered: 
If you go back to the Formosa Doctrine~ you will find that 
the responsibility is placed upon the President to determine~ 
in the event of an attack upon Quemoy and Matsu, whether this 
is in fact a preliminary to or part of an attack against the 
Pescadores and Taiwano If that is true 9 then he must parti= 
cipate because then it will become the defense of Formosa~ one 
of our allieso 
Now as to the actual value of Matsu and Quemoy, of course 
we must remember how much this seems to mean to the morale of 
all the Chinese forces on Formosao From their viewpointi any 
desertion of those islands means a complete surrender==abject 
surrendero So 11 it is a factor that anyone who is going to 
have to make possible decisions in the future has to take in-
to consideration when he talks about the abandonment of these 
sets of islandSaoo 
oooSo none of these problems is ever a simple, black and 
white thinga You have got a very great number of conflicting 
considerationso 71 
70Bulletin~ XXXIX© July 21j 1958 9 Po 114a 
71President 1 s Papers$ 1960 8 Po 4090 
CHAPTER IV 
KENNEDY AND JOHNSON: HOLDING THE STATUS QUO 
Living With The Kennedy-Nixon Debates 
During the presidential campaign in,the fall of 1960, Senator John 
r. Kennedy and Vice=President Richard M. Nixon appeared in a series of 
publicly=televised debates. The subject of Quemoy and Matsu came up 
in the course of these confrontations and prompted each participant to 
try t'O make clear his attitude on it. 
This was importantg the views expressed could reasonably be expect-
ed to provide a fairly accurats index to the winner's behavior on the 
matter once he was ensconced in the White House. 
The question of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu was actually origin-
ated by neither candidate but was rather in response to newsmen's ques-
tions before and during the debate. Vic~-President Nixon first respond-
ed in rather specific terms that implied that the United States should 
defend Quemoy and Matsu as a matter of pllinciple. A later "modification" 
of his statements tended to bring him more nearly into line with Presi-
dent Eisenhower's position under the ,Formosa Resolution. Even in his 
book, Six Crises, thelle is evidence that he never really recanted his 
- -
position. He wrote that: 
But no one 9 of course, had ever remotely suggested that 
an attack on Quemoy and Matsu could represent anything other 
than the beginning of an attack whose ultimate objective was 
72 
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Formosa itselfo1 
Such a statement. of course. directly contradicted the thesis of 
President Eisenhower when he told Congress in January 1955, that the in-
tent of the Formosa Resolution was not to enlarge American obligations 
,, 
beyond the pending treaty but to permit reaction if he determined such 
an attack to be preliminary to. or part of, an assault aimed at the 
Pescadores and Formosao 2 
It is necessary for the purpose of this study to review in detail 
some of President Kennedyus more pertinent remarks during the debates 
so that they may be compared with his later pronouncements on the sub-
ject. 
During the debate on October 7, 1960 he gave a summary of his posi-
tion on the matter; it is quoted below'at some length: 
Well the United States has on occasion attempted--mostly 
in the middle sows==to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to pull.his 
troops back to Formosao I believe strongly in the defense of 
Formosao These islands are five or six miles off the coast 
of Red China within a general harbor area, and more than 100 
miles from Formosao We have never said flatly that we would 
defend Quemoy or Matsu if attackedo We say we will defend 
it if it is a part of a general attack op Formosa, but it is 
extremely difficult to make that judgment. Mr. Herter, in 
1958, when he was Under Secretary of State, said Quemoy and 
Matsu were strategically indefensibleo Admirals Spruance 
and Collins in 1955 said that we should not attempt to defend 
these islandSooo 
General Ridgway has said the same thing. I believe that, 
if you are going to get into a war for the defense of Formosa, 
it ought to be on a clearly defined levelo•• 
I believe we should defend Formosa, we should come to its 
defense. To leave this rather in the air--that we will defend 
it under some conditions but not under others--! think is a 
mistake. 
Secondly. I would not suggest withdrawal at the point of 
1Richard Mo Nixon 9 §.!!. Crises (New York, 1962), p. 347. 
2£2!li.. Record. 84th Cong. 9 lst Sess. (1958), p. 600. 
the Communist guno It is a decision finally that the Nation-
alists should make and I believe that we should consult ·with 
them and attempt to work out a plan by which the line is drawn 
at the island of Formosaooo 
oooit has been my judgment ever since l954ooothat our 
line should be drawn in the sea around the island /of Formosa7 
itselfo 3 -- -
74 
In the debate with the Vice-President on October 13• Kennedy focus-
ed his attention on the 1954 treaty the U~ited States had signed with 
Taipei and said he would abide by'it and that it did not obligate us to 
defend the offshore islands. Attempting to clarify his position, he 
saidi 
. 
So I stand with the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, who 
said these islands were indefensible. I believe that we 
should meet our commitments, and, if the Chinese Communists 
attack the Pescadores and Formosa, they know it will mean 
war. I would not hand over the islands under the point of 
any gun, but I merely say that the treaty is quite precise, 
and I sustain the treaty.o •• 4 
A few days later Mr" Kennedy modified }}is; position and indicated 
that he supported the Eisenhower administrationpolicy on Quemoy and 
Matsu over the preceding five years. In doing this he said any American 
defense efforts in support of the offshore islands must be mounted only 
if such an attack against the offshores was part of an attack against 
Formosa and thE;i.Pescadores. 
We are told by Mro Theodore Co Sorensonin Kennedy that: 
• o o Kennedy ••• recognized that his position, while correct, 
was too sophisticated for the average /TV/ viewer who under-
stood Nixon 1 s refusal to surrender one-square inch of free 
soilo Consequently$ both Kennedy and Nixon began to emphasize 
3u •. S. News and World Report, 11Big Debate g Round 2 s II XLIX, Oct. 
l7e l960il PP• 108':i!So 
4Ibido, 0Cto 249 l96Qi Po 81. 
the official administration position.5 
The Senate 0s interview of Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk 
on January 12, 1961 seemed to presage a fresh airing of the United 
States policy respecting the offshore islands. However. when queried 
by Senator Lausche whether there was any "fixed judgment" on Formosa, 
Quemoy or Matsu, Mro Rusk said& 
••• I would not want to speak for the new administration 
on this point ••• there has not been an opportunity for the new 
administration to get in position and consult on such matters, 
and I would not want to ~ntimate a specific point of view on 
that point this morning. 
Remembering that Mr. Rusk had served as Under Secretary of State 
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for Far Eastern Affairs since about 1951, ,it would be presumed that he 
would have exhibited a bit more confidence in this matter. As a matter 
of fac·t i he could have cited United States treaty obligations and the 
Formosa Resolution without becoming the least bit controversial. 
The problem of the islands remained dormant.during President Ken-
nffdf's first eighteen months of office. 
On June 2_7 ~ 1962 the President announced at his. news conference 
that the situation in the area of the Taiwan Strait was very serious due 
to large movements of Chinese Communist forces into that area. He said 
their purposes were unclear and that'.it would therefore be best for all 
concerned if the position of the United States were clarified. He then 
. . 
discussed ·the matter at :-some length g · 
••• one possibility is that thereqnight be aggressive 
5Theodore c. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965) 9 p. 205. 
6u. s. Senatesr Hearings- Before the Committee on Fore-ign Relations. 
The Nomination of Dean Rusk: Secretary of State-Designate 1 87th Cong., 
l~t Se$SQ (~ash!ngton'TG'overnment Print!ng Office, 1961) 9 pp. 28-29 0 
action against the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. In 
that event the policy of this country will be that establish-
ed 7 years ago under the Formosa Resolution. The United States 
will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa 
and the Pescadoreso In the last crisis in the Taiwan area in 
1958 9 President Eisenhower made it clear that the United States 
would not remain inactive in the face of aggressive action 
against the offshore islands which might threaten Formosa ••• 
Under the policy sustained continuously by the United States 
Government since 1954 1 it is clear that any threat to the off-
shore islands must be judged in relation to its wider meaning 
for the safety -of Formosa and the peace of that area. 
Exactly wM.t ·actions would be necessa~ in the event of 
such an act of force would depend on the situation as it devel-
oped. But there must be no doubt that our policy, specifically 
including our readiness to take necessary actions in the face of 
force, remains just what it has been on this matter since 1955. 
It is important to have it understood that on this point the 
United States speaks with one voice. 
Later 9 during the same news conference, a reporter reminded the 
President of his remarks in 1960 about the islands being indefensible 
and of our necessity to reduce our commitments to them. To this the 
President repliedg 
I think that my statement represents the view of the 
United States Government, and the view of the United States 
Government is regulated by the resolution which was passed ••• 
by the Congress in 1955, and which has been interpreted by 
"71:resident Eisenhower and again by me ••• 
Now that is what my statement says. We stand in the 
traditional policy which has been true since 1954. 7 
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It is interesting to note that Sorenson indicated that major cause 
for the 1962 tensions with respect to the offshore islands rested with 
Chiang Kai=sheko He wrote that Chiang Kai=shek began talking freely 
about a Nationalist invasion, 11 0 •• hoping to embarrass the United States 
into action." What kind of precise action he did not specify. Accord-
ing to Sorenson~ the Chinese Communists then began a large-scale move-
ment of troops into the coastal sectors=-presumably because they were 
7President 0 s Papers~ 1962 9 pp. 509=510, 512. 
agitated and fearful about Chiang's bellicose statements. Sorenson 
said that after President Kennedy issued his reaffirmation of American 
intention to defend Formosa, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands 
(if the attack threatened Formosa), " ••• tensions on both sides of the 
Formosa Straits soon subsided."8 There was no comment by Sorenson as 
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to whether the Chinese Communists subsequently removed these forces from 
the coastal provinces. Also, and perhaps significantly, Sorenson did 
not discuss or even mention any problem relating to the size of the 
offshore garrisons or any attempts by the United States to have them 
increased or reduced. 
As is the case with Eisenhower 0s reference to Chiang Kai-shek's 
"responsibilities," Sorenson's remarks are not necessarily the last 
word on the subject. Speaking on the American Broadcasting Company's 
television network program "Issues and Answers" on July a, 1962, Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk did not attempt to be so narrow when discussing 
the causative elements of the 1962 offshore island "crisis"; he said: 
It is always a little dangerous to try to say exactly 
what is in the mind of someone on the other side, on the main-
land for example. There seems to have been some reinforcement 
of the areas adjacent to Formosa, but there are several possible 
explanations, including present measures in view of some of the 
speeches and talk that bas been coming out of Formosa. Another 
might well be the disturbances which have been associated with 
food shorta1.es and floods in that part of mainland China. 
There are /alsp7 some indications that perhaps the Communist 
d!scipline-in that area has not been as tight as they had ex-
peqted it to be.9 
Un4e~lining the coMplexities of decision-making within the general con-
text of the historic United States defense policy for the offshore 
8sorenson 9 pp. 661-662. 
9iu11et.tn:. tt!t., Julr 30, 19.62, p •.. 100. 
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islands was another comment by Secretary Rusk. On the same television 
program 9 he was asked if there were any conceivable circumstances under 
which an attack on the offshore islands might be adjudged as not consti-
tuting a threat to Formosa and the Pescadores. In reply, he said: 
I think this is a matter on which the President would have 
to make a judgment, and I would_ not myself want to speculate 
about the circumstances under whlch that judgment would be made. 
Notwithstanding his earlier remarks in the 1960 debates, the record 
clearly establishes that President Kennedy picked up the old policy 
where his predecessor left it. The formal language of the 1954 treaty 
and the 1955 resolution would continue to provide the necessary basis 
for public discussions and pronouncements. The interpretations and de-
cisions would remain, as before, a matter of Presidential discretion and 
temperament. 
Johnson8 Endorsement and Dormancy 
Up to the time Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the Presidency.from the 
assassinated Kennedy 9 there had occurred no perceptible shift in United 
States policy with regard to the defense of the offshore islands. A 
search of the public records revealed no substantive policy statements 
by President Johnson or members of his administration with direct refer-
ence to the matter. 
The President did make some remarks about the general problem of 
Communist aggression in the Taiwan Strait area during the campaign pre-
ceding presidential elections in the fall of 1964-. On twelve different 
occasions betweeen September 28 and October 31, the President emphasized 
how-closely he had worked with President Eisenhower during the 1958 
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Formosa cr!•iso He noted that he was in full agreement with him, saying 
upon one occasion that "Lyndon Johnson stood l'i'ght by the side of Eisen-
. 10 bower at Suez and in the Strait of Formosao 11 
The record 9 then, reveals no precise Johnson endor1sements of the 
' : , • ·/\ •• : I_ 
policies that were.followed by Presidents Eisenhower and.I<ennedy--poli-
,·. 1} 
,-:"i· .. :•:;_ 
c,i.es that neve:i(.really moved to the center of,-·pubiic notice and criti-
cism until forced there by the pr,essure of events. 
1,j,\· {•, .,..:·. 
Although it mi~ht be said that President Johnson's campaign endorse-
ments of President Eisenhower 9s policiesar,e-sufficient evidence in them-
selves, they mu~t be regarded and valued only for what they really are--
•. )' ,:; ' 
political remarks made during the heat of a presidential election cam-
paign. 
:I .. 
In the absence of any retnar,ks to the'contra~y, however, it is a 
reasonable infe;en~e that the :President feels.he has sufficient latitude 
under the terms of the extant Formosa Resolution and the 1955 treaty. 
Therefore 1 any public statements without good cause would merely agitate 
otherwise placid political waters. 
A further observation might be at least as cr,edible: the problem 
of the ~ffshore islands has lain dormant for so ~ong that man,y people 
have simply forgotten it 0 
·. :. ·. .., " 
For example, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held exten-
sive hearings throughout most of MaI'c~• 1966 with regard to our over;.all 
policy on mainland Chinao One of the expert witnes~es present to testi• 
fy on March 30, was Dro Robert Ao Scalapino, Chairman of the Political 
10President 9s Papers, 1963=64 9 pp. 1161 9 1242, 1395, 1476 9 1484 1 
1501 1 1510 1 1551, 15sa~ 
BO 
Science Department at the University of California and editor of the 
monthly journal Asian Survey. He had contributed the "Northeast Asia 
Section" of the Conlon Report of 1959 11 one of fifteen such studies auth-
orized by the Foreign Relations Committee to be accomplished by expert 
I 
and scholarly sources. In his contribution to that 1959 report, Dr. 
Scalapino observed, inter alia: 
The offshore island issue is extremely serious" It might 
become critical again at any point. Thus it is possible to 
argue that ••• we should extricate the Nationalists and ourselves 
from this area. These islands bear no relation to the defense 
of Taiwan. and can only be considered as steppingstones to the 
mainland •••• They are an integroal part of the mainland. Mili= 
tarily they are very vulnerable. Politically, they are a li-
ability, both in terms of world opinion and in terms of the 
unhealthy psychology they foster in Taiwan. In the event of 
full military action over them. the American people would be 
of divided op!nions 0 ll 
One of Dr. Scalapino 0s 1959 recomm·endations on carrying out a poli-
Cy of "exploration and negot.iationwv with Communist China was " ••• that 
the military forces of Taiwan would be withdrawn from the offshore is= 
lands, together with those civilians desiring to leave." 
During the hearings on March_30 9 19661) the following exchange be-
tween Senator Lausche and Dr. Scalapino occurredg 
Senator Lauscheg /You recommended7that the Kuomintang forces 
be withdrawn from the offshore islands of 
Quemoy and Matsu? 
Dr. $calapinoi I do not have the wording i.n front of me, but 
Ibelieve that is cdrreet" ·· 
Senator Lauscheg Do you still adhere'to that recommendation? 
llu. s. Senate~~· Foreign Policyi Compilation of Studies 
(Washingtom Government Printing Office 11 March 15, 1961), pp. 549-550. 
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Dro Scalapinog I am not certain that I dOoool 2 
The foregoing episode casts no reflection of any kind upon D:r>o 
Scalapinoo It merely serves to illustrate how very important issues, 
even though never fully resolved» are frequently relegated to a position 
of such low priority that they are for all practical purposes forgotten. 
To a wide extent this dormancy of the offshore island problem was 
reflected throughout the entire spring hearingso In over 650 pages of 
testimony by expert witnesses on the state of our China policy» the prob-
lem of the offshore islands was mentioned but very few times and then 
most briefly.13 
Finally 9 it must be noted that despite the dormancy of the issue, 
the government 0s day=to-day assessments of the problem must be continu-
ing in much the same manner as in the days of the ~isenhower Administra-
tion. In a recent discussion of the matter with the Chief of the Repub-
lie of China Desk, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Af-
fairs 9 the author was apprised that the current public policy of the 
United States Government is as followsg 
The present position of the United States Government with 
respect to the defense of the Chinese qffshore islands remains 
precisely the same as it was upon the original passage of Public 
Law Number ; 1+ 1> 84th Congress g 1st Session. .That is» the Pres! .. 
dent will take such action in the defense of Formosa and the· 
Pescadores as he deems necessa:r,,y and withinl'the authority pro= 
iided by . Public Law 4. Addi tiolnally ;,. any· actions taken undel;' 
this law will be in consonance with1 the original request sub= 
mitted to the Congress in which the President called for the 
12uo s. Senate 9 Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
United States Policy ~ Respect !2. Mainland China, 89th Cong.» 2d 
Sesso (Washingtom Government Printing Office~ 1966), pp" 578-57 9. 
13The May 1966 hearings were held in order to get scholarly and 
expert opinion on Sino=United States Relations. There were no spokes-
men present on behalf of the Government at these cited hearings. 
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authority con-ta.ined· therein o 14 
The desk chief I) Mr. Josiah .W" Bennettl) -also noted that there had oc= 
curred no public pronouncements by the present administration concerning 
the subject of troop levels on the offshore islands. 
l 4Persona1 telephone conversation on July 13 9 196-6 between the 
author and Mr. Josiah w. Bennett 9 Chief, Republic of China Des~ 9 Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of St.ate for Far Eastern Affairs. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is apparent that American policy with respect to the Chinese 
offshore islands has always been intimately related to the larger issue 
of the island of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. Formosa and the 
Pescadores 9 in turn 9 have peen of varied importance in United States 
planning because of the strategic and political value assigned to them 
by American policymakers. Immec;liate post ... world War II plans. as we have 
seen 9 did not comprehend much beyond the simple denial of Formosa to the 
Chinese Communists-=and th,t only through the employment of non-military 
means. However, with the advent of the Korean War the strategy of mere 
denial changed. The interposition of the Seventh Fleet signified a more 
positive approach to the containment of Communism in the Far East. Coupl-
ed with United States efforts on the Korean Peninsula, it became clear. 
that an Asian version of the Truman Doctrine was being placed into ef-
feet in that regiona 
Research for this study clearly shows that with the advent of the 
Korean War Amer.i.can pol.icy began to evidence much more positive charac-
teristics. A series of Far Eastern mutual defense treaties, ranging 
from Korea and Japan to the Philippines and Australia. was entered into 
by the United States during the l950vso The inclusion of a treaty with 
the Chinese Nationalist government in· this series underscored the new · 
and long ... range outlook that .the United State.s was assuming. In other 
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words. mere denial to the Chinese Communists of Formosa would no longer 
suffice; Formosai and the Nationalist regime were, ~t this point, con-
sidered to be vitally important to United States intere~ts in the Far 
\. 
East. Thus it became important for the United States to ensure these-
curity of Formosa and the Pescadores. The issue of the offshore islands 
evolved from this commitment. 
This study has revealed that the offshore islands were but one con-
sideration within what the Eisenhower administration viewed as an immin-
ent threat to the safety and security of Formosa and the Pescadores in 
1954-1955. In dealing with this assumed threat. the administration 
wanted flexibility of action for a very fluid military situation, and 
at least professed unity at the top levels of the American policymaking 
edifice. The provisions of the Formosa Resolution (Public Law 4), draft-
ed in fact by the State Department, provided the needed latitude for 
presidential discretion in the taking of strategic and tactical decisions. 
The enactment of Public Law 4 also assured the President of Congressional 
approval for whatever actions he might later deem necessary to take in 
the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores above and beyond the obliga-
tions the United States had assumed in the 1954 Sino-American Treaty. 
It is interesting to note that President Eisenhower succeeded in 
making the Congress a party to his strategic and military planning in 
a very effective manner. He not only strengthened the prerogative of 
Congress in the foreign policy making field, but did it in such a way 
that any later partisan criticism of his actions would be effectively 
blunted even before it became public; it was "consensus-making" in the 
grandest manner. 
Although administration plans for defensive measures outside the 
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territories of Formosa and the Pescadores proper certainly included con-
siderations beyond the offshore islands themselvesi the policy was later 
widely interpreted and reported as one aimed principally, if not solely, 
at those islandso With the departure of Secretary Dulles, Senator Know-
land~ Admiral Radford, and others of similar persuasion from the field, 
the concept of employing United States forces against mainland targets 
has been gradually removed from the area of serious planning, except for. 
the short interlude of the 1958 crisis. 
The authority established by the Formosa Resolution 9 as interpreted 
by successive Presidents, has provided the real basis for the American 
position regarding the defense of the offshore islands. That policy, 
essentially, has been four=faceted, viz. 9 it has (l) reserved to the 
President 9 in totality, the prerogative of making all final decisions 
with respect to the employment of United States strategic and/or tacti-
cal military forces for the defense of the offshore islands; (2) by in~ 
terpretatione following the Tachen evacuation, called for no absolute 
beforehand 11 inclusionsvi or "exclusions" of the offshore islands in Ameri-
can defense planning; (3) always purportedly tied any measures to defend 
the offshore islands to a determination that such measures were to be 
taken only if an assault against the offshore islands were identifiable 
... as part of a wider threat against Formosa proper; and 9 ( l.f.) necessitated, 
by its very nature, a crisis=oriented decision=making environment. 
Research for this study produced no evidence to suggest that these 
four basic conditions for planning and deciding have been permanently 
altered==either singly or in combination. Despite alternating periods 
of tranquility and tension, the fl"amework, the "policy19 if you will, 
within which decisions might be takens remains fundamentally what is was 
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in 1954-55. Caution must be exercised in accepting the various judgments 
concerning the impact of the 1958 crisis on longer-range United States 
policy. By no means should cne conclude that that episode completely 
negated previous policy or s'et an iron ... bound precedent necessitating fu-
ture commitment. It must be placed in its proper perspective along the 
1954-1966 policy continuum. When viewed in this manner its effect on 
"permanent" offshore island defense policy becomes far more meaningful, 
albeit perhaps less dramatic. 
In any consideration of precedent, and past versus present policy, 
it is profitable to keep in mind that Eisenhower, Dulles, and Kennedy 
either stated or implied that any American action in the defense b.f the 
offshore islands would be mounted only in response to an assault that 
was part and parcel of a larger effort clearly threatening Formosa and 
the Pescadores. Such statements reveal a decidedly narrowr,''interpreta-
tion" of the provisions of Public Law 4. The authority contained in 
that statute is far broader, and would even permit the garrisoning of 
Quemoy and Matsu with American troops--if indeed the President so decid-
ed. An assault by the Chinese Communists in a case like that would 
certainly make academic any interim judgment of whether the attack was 
identifiable as part of a larger move against Formosa and the Pescadores. 
Obviously, however, successive Commanders-in-Chief have chosen to remain 
within the guidelines laid down by President Eisenhower's message to Con-
gress that requested passage of the Formosa Resolution. In that message, 
he said he would not use the requested authority unless needed to repel 
attacks (or pending attacks) that contained recognizable designs against 
the safety of Formosa and the Pescadores as a wider goal. There is 
little do~bt, of course, that such a fine determination is very difficult 
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to make. Any serious effort to so categorize an incipient threat to 
Formosa requires the highest quality of foreknowledge of enemy inten-
tions--his genuine intentionst that is, and not merely some "finding" 
perhaps based upon contrivance or expediency occasioned by possible 
shortcomings of what was originally conceived to be an adequate policy, 
There is no doubt that such a course has generated ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the public mind. This was amply illustrated by adminis-
tration efforts to make United States policy with respect to the off-
shore islands 19clear" in 1958 11 yet remain formally "uncommited." An-
other example of what studied enlgmatism can produce was the troop dis-
pos'it!on rationalization indulged in by Eisenhower and Dulles when the 
time came to shoulder responsibility for a policy freely chosen by them 
beforehand. Neither of the foregoing responses should have been totally 
unexpected in view of the crisis=oriented approach that United States 
policy has followedo 
Also, it should be noted that actions of both the Chinese Communists 
and Nationalists have on occasion significantly affected the context with-
in which the United States government has had to consider the problem of 
Formosa. the Pescadores, and the various offshore islands. To the Com-
munists, the issue has provided numerous avenues for the exploitation 
of political and propaganda opportunities" For their Nationalist adver~ 
saries it has furnished numerous advantages through which they might 
further strengthen their political• military, and economic position on 
Taiwan. Whether Chiang Kai=shek has been enabled to actually employ the 
issue to the extent that he is the real decider of United States policy, 
as maintained by some 9 remains speculative and controversial. That 
American policy is dictated year after year by Chiang's alleged scheming 
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suggests a "delegation" of American policy p
1
lanning autho"'t'it~ that is 
most difficult to sustain. There can be little doubt, h,owever • that the 
issue has given both him and his opponents on the mainl~n4 certain gra-
tuitous opportunities on occasion to increase tensions in the Formosa 
Strait and to compound America's foreign policy problems--not only in 
the Western Pacific region 9 but in the United States 0 relationships with 
various allies, members of the Soviet Bloc, and some of the non-aligned 
nations as well. 
On balance. there seems little likelihood that any significant al-
teration in United States policy will occur-=at least in the near future. 
A reconciliation between the United States and the People 9s Republic of 
China, or some other development of an equally momentous nature could, 
of course, greatly influence American policy with respect to the offshore 
islands and the wider question of American security requirements in the 
Western Pacific region. This is similarly quite unlikely in the short 
term. 
It is possible 9 as pointed out by Professor Morgenthau, that a dif-
ferent course of action might better have served American interests. 
While not in full agreement with his contention that simply the denial 
of Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists would suffice, the auth-
or tends to agree with his more basic premise--that America's policy 
with reference to the offshore islands has accomplished little more than 
a precarious maintenance of a fundamentally unsatisfactory status quo. 
Adams, Sherman. 
istration. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY INFORMATION PAPER--FORMOSA. SPECIAL GUIDANCE 
NO. 28, DECEMBER 23, 1949. 
I. Problem 
To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United 
States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to 
the Chinese Communist forces. 
II. Backgttound 
A. Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances 
on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part 
of China under Nationalist control. Attention is focused by three prin-
cipal elements. 
l. Communists. world-wide 9 who charge the United States with con-
spiring to build the island into_a fortress to be taken over by the 
United States (if it does not al~ea.ciy. control it) , thereby trying to 
brand the United States with the ma~)~·_pf aggressive imperialism, and al= 
so hoping to get us involved in a risky and unpromising venture; 
2. ProaNationalists (principally in the United States) who con= 
sider Formosa a redoubt in which the government could survive~ and who 
tend to create an impression the United States is delinquent if it fails 
to 19save Formosa"; 
3. Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of 
the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to 
the Communists, largely because of mistaken popular conception of its 
strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific. 
B. Loss of the island is widely anticipatedi and the matter in 
which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the 
Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. Its fall would threaten: 
l. Loss of United States prestige at home and abroad to the extent 
we have become committed in the public mind to hold it; 
2. Damage to the morale of other nationss particularly in the Far 
East 9 which are disturbed by the Communist gains and fear its possible 
further advances. 
C. Formosa 9 politically 9 geographically, and strategically 9 is 
part of China in no especially distinguished or important way. Though 
ruled by the Japanese (as "Taiwan") for 50 years 9 historically it has 
been Chinese. Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese re= 
sponsibility. 
It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be 
determined by the Japanese peace settlement 9 but the Cairo agreement and 
the Potsdam declaration and the surrender terms of September 2 9 1945 9 
looked to its return to China and the United States facilitated its 
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takeover by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day. 
Even the small United States militax•y advisory group sent there at 
Chinese Governmentrequest was completely withdrawn a year ago. Merely 
a handful of military attache personnel with diplomatic status remains. 
The United States never has had military bases there, and never has 
sought any special concessions there. 
ECA work done on the island, particularly through the Joint Com= 
mission on Rural Reconstruction, has been of purely economic and tech-
nical nature for assistance in improvement of conditions, and no quid 
pro quo has been sought. 
D. United States public opinion has concerned itself primarily 
with the question of the island's strategic importance; there has been 
insistent demand from a few sources for military action by the United 
States, but it has not assumed significant proportions. Rather public 
opinion is obviously divided and uncertain, and there is no apparent 
consensus for a particular course of active intervention. 
IIL Treatment 
A. If rising public interest warrants it, gradually increasing 
attention may be paid Formosa, to establish the facts indicated below. 
Overseas use should be made of unofficial materials in public analysis 
and comment appearing both at home and abroad, as well as official state-
ments as they may appear. Label conflicting public statements properly 
as "individual expression of opinion," as "unofficial," etc. 
B. All material should be used best to counter the false impres-
sions thati 
l. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government; 
2. The United States has a special interest in or 11designs on" 
the island or any military bases on Formosa; 
3. Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the 
United States or of other countries opposing communism; 
4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way 
to act to save Formosa. 
C. Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject 9 em= 
phasize as appropriate any of the following main points: 
1. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese 
Government: 
(a) Historically and geographically a part of China; 
(b) The national government has run the island's affairs 
since the take-over and is responsible for present conditions there; 
(c) The United States has assumed no responsibilities or obli~ 
gations 9 actual or moral. 
2. Formosa has no special military significance: 
(a) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast; 
(b) Other potential objects of Communists aggression are clos-
er to points on the Chinese mainland than to Formosa; 
(c) China has never been a sea power and the island is of no 
special strategic advantage to the Chineses Communist armed forces. 
3. Economic assistance in Formosa has been for economic and social 
purposes, has been consistent with demonstrated United States concern 
for the welfare of the Chinese generally, and has involved no thought 
of special concessions for the United States. 
4. In areas of insistent demand for United States action, 
particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make 
clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa. sending in t~oopsg 
supplying arms 9 dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action 
wouldg 
(a) Accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist 
regime; 
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(b) Involve the United States in a long=term venture producing 
at best a new area of bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involve-
ment in open warfare; 
(c) Subject the United States to a violent propaganda barrage 
and to reaction against our "militar1sm 9 imperialism, and interference" 
even from friendly peoples\) and particularly from Chinese, who would be 
turned against us anew; 
(c) Eminently suit purposes of the u.s.s.R., which would like 
to see us "substantiate" its propaganda, dissipate our energies and 
weaken effectiveness of our policies generally by such action. 
s. In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of 
various kinds in Formosai avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by 
. their limited (usually individual) source, and make clear that the 
total of such demands evidences concern and frustration in some quar-
ters but does not add up to a consensus on any particular position 
different from that officially taken. 
D. Avoidi 
l. Speculation which would show undue concern with whether Nation-
alists can hold the island or when Communists may take it; 
2. References which would indicate' important strategic signifi-
cance9 or that the island is a political entity; 
3. In output to China, any emphasis on bad conditions in Formosa 
under the Nationalistsi although to other areas reference can be made 
to reasons why Nationalists are vulnerable there as they are elsewhereo 
4o Statements that Formosa 1 s final status still is to be deter= 
mined by the Japanese peace treatyo 
5o Name "Taiwan"; use "Formosa." 
Source~ William, William Appleman, ed. !h!,. Shaping 2£.American Diplo; 
macy. Chicago~ Rand McNally and Co.t 1956, pp. 1108-llll. 
APPENDIX B 
PROVISIONS OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND PERTINENT DATES 
Signed at Washington December 2, 1954; Ratification advised by the 
Senate of the United States February 9, 1955; Ratified by the Presiden.t 
of the United States February lli 1955; Ratified by the Republic of 
China February 15, 1955; Ratifications exchanged at Taipei March 3, 
1955; Proclaimed by the President of the United States April lj 1955; 
Entered into fo:r>ce March 3, 1955. 
The Parties to this Treaty, 
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to 
live in peace with all peoples and all Governments» and de-
siring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific 
Area, 
Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which 
brought their two peoples together in a common bond of 
sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against 
imperialist aggression during the last war, 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense 
of unity and their common determination to defend themselves 
against external armed attack& so that no potential aggressor 
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone 
.in the West Pacific Areai) and · 
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for 
collective defense for the preservation of peace and security 
pending the development of a more comprehensive system of 
regional security in the West Pacific Area, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The parties undertake 9 as set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations 9 to settle any international dispute in which they may be in= 
volved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peacei 
security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their inter= 
national relations from the threat or use of force in any manner incon= 
sistent with the purposes of the United Nationso 
ARTICLE II 
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, 
96 
97 
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual ald will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist 
armed attack and communist subvel'.'.sion activities directed from w.ithout 
against their territorial integrity and political stability. 
ARTICLE !II 
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to 
cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and 
social well=being and to further their individual and collective efforts 
toward these ends. 
ARTICLE IV 
The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies~ 
will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation 
of this Treatyo 
ARTICLE V 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area 
directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be danger= 
ous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United 
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to restore and.maintain international 
peace and security. 
ARTICLE VI 
For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms 11territoria1vi and 
"territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China~ Taiwan and 
the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America 9 the is= 
land territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdictiono· The pro= 
visions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territor= 
ies as may be determined by mutual agreement" 
ARTICLE VII 
The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government 
of the United States of America accepts 9 the right to dispose such United 
States land 5 air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores 
as may be required for their defense$ as determined by mutual agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affect-
ing in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Char= 
ter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations 
for the maintenance of international peace and securityQ 
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ARTICLlr IX 
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and 
the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification 
thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei. 
ARTICLE X 
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may 
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party. 
Source: U. s. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Treaty Provisions Relating !2_ ~ ~ ~ £:....§_. Forces !:.2!'.. Mutual 
Defense. Committee Print. 84th Cong., 2d Sess. Washington: 
Government Printing Office. Dec. 27, 1956, pp. 29-30 
APPENDIX C 
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND RELATED POSI-
TIONS AND TERRITORIES OF THAT AREA: Public Law 4, 84th Congress, 1st 
Session, January 29, 1955 
Whereas the primary purpose of the United States 1 in its relations with 
all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace 
for all; and · 
Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction 
of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and 
declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that 
such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on· 
Formosa and the Pescadores, 
Whereas such arm~d attac)<: if continued would gravely endanger the pea<:e 
and security of. the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and 
the Pescadores; and 
Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western 
Pacific Island chain, of.which Formosa is a part~ is essential to the 
vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or 
bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and 
Whereas the Pre.;ident of the United States on January 69 1955 9 submit-
ted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual 
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China 9 
which recognizes that anarmed attack in·the West.Pacific area directed· 
against territories, therein described, in the re,gion of Formosa and 
the Pescadores,would be dangerous •to the·peace and safety of the pa:r:, ... 
ties to the trieaty: Therefore be ft · · 
Re~olv~d by the Senate and the House of Repriesentatives of the United 
States in Congriess assembled 9 That the President of the United States 
be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United 
States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and 
protecting Formosa and the Pescadories against armed attack, this author-
ity to include the securing and protection of such related positions and 
territories of that ariea now in friiendly hands and the taking of such 
other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring 
the defense of Formosa and the Pescadories. 
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the 
I 
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peace and security of the area is reasonably assUI'ed by international 
conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and 
shall so report to the Congress. 
Sourceg American Foreifn Policy 9 1950-55; Basic Documents. Washing= 
tong Government Pr nting Office 9 1957, pp. 2486=2487. 
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APPENDIX D 
MEMORANDUM RE FORMOSA STRAIT SITUATIONg SEPTEMBER 4 9 1958 
Events in the Taiwan Straits indicate that the Chicomsi with Soviet 
backing, have begun tentatively to put into operation a program, which 
has been prepared for over the past 3 yearsi designed initially to liq= 
uidate the Chinat positions in Taiwan and the offshore islands, and with 
probably even more far=reaching purposes" 
The program has been begun by intense pressure on the weakest and 
most vulnerable of such positions, namelyi the Chinat=held offshore is= 
lands of Quemoy and Matsu. It seems that the operation is designed ··to 
produce a cumulating rollback effect 9 first on the offshore islandst 
and then on Taiwan. the "liberation" of which is the announced purpose 
of the present phase. The "liberation," if it occurred, would have 
serious repercussions on the Philippines, Japan 9 and other friendly 
countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. 
The first phase of the operation-=that involving Quemoy and/or 
Matsu==would be primarily military; for these initial obstacles cannot 
be overcome otherwise. The follow=up against Taiwan might be primarily 
subversivei taking advantage of the blow to the Republic of China in= 
valved in the loss of the offshore islands where it has virtually stak= 
edits future. However 9 armed Chicom attack against Taiwan is not to be 
excluded. This is~ indeed, forecast by the current Chinese Communist 
broadcasts. · 
The taking over of Taiwan by the Communists would greatly enhance 
Communist influence and prestige throughout the free Asian world and 
depreciate that of the U.S. 
The foregoing summary is based upon the following more specific 
estimatesg 
1) In the absence of US intervention 9 the Chicoms 9 by accepting 
heavy casualties, could take Quemoy by an amphibious assault supported 
by artillery and aerial bombardment. Such an assault could be staged 
with little advance notice. The operation once initiated might take 
from one to several days depending on the quality of the resistance. 
2) If the Chicoms believe the US will not intervenei they can be 
expected to mount such an assault whenever they believe the defenders 
have been sufficiently "softened up." 
3) If the Chicoms believe the US would actively intervene to throw 
back an assaulti perhaps using nuclear weapons, it is probable there 
would be no attempt to take Quemoy by assault and the situation might 
quiet down, as in 1955. 
4) It is, however, also possible that if the Chicoms felt that the 
US would intervene only if there were a major assault, they might keep 
that assault as an overhanging menace but never an actuality, and 
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meanwhile continue the type of pressures now being exertedt including 
bombardment and attempted blockade, on the theory that if this were p~o= 
longedi the defense would collapse due to deterioration of morale and 
lack of supply. 
5) Under these conditions 9 and if inte:r>diction were not broken 11 the 
morale and defense capability of the de.fenders would, in fact 9 deterio= 
rate and might eventually collapse, particularly since the US would 
find it difficult to find new ways to support the morale. Indeedi the 
US would find it dlfficult to maintain in the area its present show of 
strength for any considerable period of time. 
6) If Quemoy were lost either through assault or surrender, this 
would have a serious impact upon the authority and military capability 
of the anti-Communist, pro-US, government on Formosa. It would be ex-
posed to subversive and/or military action which would probably bring 
about a government which would eventually advocate union with Commun= 
ist China and the elimination of ·US positions on the island. 
7) If the foregoing occurred, it would seriously jeopardize the 
anti-Communist barrier consisdng of the island and peninsular positions 
in the Western Pacific; e.g., Japan, Republic of Korea» Republic of 
China, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Other govern= 
ments in Southeast Asia such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia 9 
Laos and Burma would probably come fully under Communist influence. US 
positions in this area, perhaps even Okinawa, would probably become un-
tenable, or unusable, and Japan with its great industrial potential 
would probably fall within the Sino=Soviet orbit. These events would 
not happen all at once but would probably occur over a period of a few 
years. The consequences in the Far East would be even more far=reach= 
ing and catastrophic than those which followed when the United States 
allowed the Chinese mainland to be taken over by the Chinese Communists, 
a.ided and abetted by the Soviet Union. 
8) The impact of these adverse developments in the Western Pacific 
and Southeast Asia would undoubtedly have serious, world-wide effectso 
9) If the Communists$ acting on the supposition that we will not 
actively intervene, seek to take Quemoy by assault and become increas= 
ingly committed» and if we then do intervene~ there might be a period 
between the beginning of assault and irrevocable commitment when 
prompt and substantial US intervention with conventional weapons might 
lead the Chicoms to withhold or reverse their assault effort. Other= 
wises our intervention would probably not be effective if it were 
limited to the use of conventional weapons. 
10) US destroyers are cooperating with the Chinat sea supply 
operations within the limits of international waters~ i.eo 9 up to with= 
in three miles of Quemoy. There is thus a possibility of a deliberate 
or accidental hit by the Chicomsj which would have potential and un~ 
planned reactions which might involve at least limited retaliation. 
11) Once we intervened to save the offshore islands~ we could not 
abandon that result without unacceptable damage to the safety of the 
free world and our influence in ito 
If accomplishment of this result required the use of nuclear weap= 
onse there would be a strong popular revulsion against the US in most 
of the world. It would be particularly intense in Asia and particular= 
ly harmful to us in Japan. 
If relatively small detonations were used with only air burst, so 
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that there would be no appreciable fallout or la'!'ge civilian casualties!) 
and if the matter were quickly closed, the revulsion might not be long= 
lived or entail consequences as far=reaching and permanent as though 
there had occ1.u."'red the series of political reve:r:•sals i.ndicated in Point 
7 aboveo It is not certain, however 9 that the operation could thus be 
limited in scope or time, and the risk of a more extensive use of nuclea~ 
weaponsi and even a risk of general war» would have to be acceptedo 
(References are here made to Quemoy as the most likely Communist 
targeto If Matsu became the initial target, the situation would be 
substantially the sameo) 
Source: Eisenhower 9 Dwight D. Waging Peaceo Garden City~ New York: 
Doubleday and Coo, 1965$ pp. 691=693. 
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